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Summary
The world is increasingly forced to face the challenge 
of how to ensure access to adequate water resources 
for expanding populations and economies, whilst 
maintaining healthy freshwater ecosystems and the vital 
services they provide. Now the growing impacts of 
climate change are exacerbating the problem of water 
scarcity in key regions of the world. One popular way 
for governments to distribute water more evenly across 
the landscape is to transfer it from areas with perceived 
surpluses, to those with shortages. 
While there is a long history of water transfers from 
ancient times, as many societies reach the limits 
of locally renewable water supplies increasingly 
large quantities of water are being moved over long 
distances, from one river basin to another. Since the 
beginning of dam building that marked the last half 
of the 1900s more that 364 large-scale interbasin 
water transfer schemes (IBTs) have been established 
that transfer around 400 km³ of water per year 
(Shiklomanov 1999). IBTs are now widely touted as the 
quick ﬁx solution to meeting escalating water demands. 
One estimate suggests that the total number of large-
scale water transfer schemes may rise to between 760 
and 1 240 by 2020 to transfer up to 800 km³ of water 
per year (Shiklomanov 1999).
The wide range of IBT projects in place, or proposed, 
has provoked the preparation of this review, including 
seven case studies from around the globe. It builds 
on previous assessments and examines the costs and 
beneﬁts of large scale IBTs. This report assesses 
related, emerging issues in sustaining water resources 
and ecosystems, namely the virtual water trade, 
expanding use of desalination, and climate change 
adaptation. It is based on WWF‘s 2007 publication 
„Pipedreams? Interbasin water transfers and water 
shortages“.
The report concludes that while IBTs can potentially 
solve water supply issues in regions of water shortage 
– they come with signiﬁcant costs. Large scale IBTs are 
typically very high cost, and thus economically risky, 
and they usually also come with signiﬁcant social and 
environmental costs; usually for both the river basin 
providing and the river basin receiving the water.
From an environmental perspective, IBTs in general 
interrupt the connectivity of river systems and therefore 
disrupt ﬁsh spawning and migration. They alter 
natural ﬂow regimes, sometimes with great ecological 
cost to threatened aquatic species or protected areas, 
they alter river morphology, and they contribute 
to salinization, and can also enable the transfer of 
invasive alien species between river basins. IBTs may 
facilitate unwise and unsustainable urban and irrigation 
developments.
What stands out among the IBT case studies outlined in 
this report (and elsewhere) is the following:
1. Apart from hydropower generation, a common 
driver of IBTs is a desire to promote irrigated 
agricultural production in water poor areas. This 
can see unsustainable and subsidized cropping 
practices promoted by the IBT;
2. There is typically a failure to examine alternatives 
to the IBT that may mean delaying, deferring or 
avoiding the costs (in every sense) of an IBT or 
examining options of transferring virtual water 
rather than real water; and
3. There are a range of governance failures ranging 
from poor to non-existent consultation with affected 
people, to failing to give sufﬁcient consideration to 
the environmental, social and cultural impacts of 
the IBT, in both the donor and recipient basins. 
The history of IBTs to date should be sufﬁcient to 
sound very loud alarm bells for any government 
contemplating such a development. Despite the lessons 
from past IBT experiences, many decision makers 
today continue to see IBTs as a technical solution to 
restore perceived imbalances in water distribution. 
The development of IBTs usually disturbs the ﬁnely 
tuned water balance in both the donating and the 
receiving river basin. Regularly overlooked in IBT 
development are the short, medium and longer term 
impacts of moving water from one community (the 
donor basin) and providing it to another (the recipient 
basin). 
As noted above, weak governance is also symptomatic 
of IBT development, with poor to non-existent 
consultation with affected people commonly being 
witnessed and a lack of consideration at an appropriate 
management scale. This failure to look at the impacts 
of the proposed IBT within a river basin management 
framework considerably elevates the risks of 
‘collateral damage’ from the IBT. Now, the advent 
of ongoing, climate-induced changes in hydrology 
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makes investments in inﬂexible water infrastructure 
increasingly risky. Through employing the management 
model of Integrated River Basin Management 
governments and civil society will be much better 
placed to make well informed decisions in relation to 
IBTs. 
WWF recognises that while local IBTs may, under 
certain circumstances, fulﬁl an important role (for 
example in supplying drinking water to population 
centres) the beneﬁts of many large scale transfer 
schemes on the drawing board are doubtful. WWF 
believes that any new interbasin water transfer scheme 
should be approached in accordance with the principles 
of sustainability set out by the World Commission 
on Dams (2000) and most recently addressed by the 
revised Sustainability Assessment Protocol (HSAF1 
2009, in preparation). First and foremost this means 
that any scheme under consideration should be subject 
to a comprehensive ‘needs and options assessment’; 
detailed cost-beneﬁt and risk analyses that consider 
the full suite of potential environmental, social and 
economic risks and impacts.
As advocated in section 6 of this report in examining 
the alternatives to an IBT, WWF recommends 
the following step-wise needs assessment, ideally 
considered at a whole-of-river-basin level, through an 
integrated planning process. The alternatives should be 
considered in the following order: 
1 The Hydropower Sustainability Assessment Forum (HSAF) 
currently revises the International Hydropower Association‘s (IHA) 
Sustainability Assessment Protocol. The HSAF is a collaboration of 
representatives from different sectors to develop a broadly endorsed 
sustainability assessment tool to measure and guide performance 
in the hydropower sector. This Protocol is applicable not only to 
hydropower schemes, but to water infrastructure projects and plans 
in general. It will be released in 2009. Further Information:  
http://www.hydropower.org/sustainable_hydropower/HSAF.html
A. Demand Management
1. Reducing water demands;
2. Recycling waste water; 
3. Assessing and promoting land use management 
or industrial development alternatives.
B. Supply Management
4. Trading in virtual water, and only then,
5. Supplementing water supplies locally, and only 
then,
6. Desalination in water-scarce coastal areas, and 
only then,
7. Considering an IBT, as a last option.
Through the vehicle of this report, WWF calls on all 
decision makers to follow the steps outlined above 
when considering how to meet water needs in areas of 
scarcity. There is a need to recognise that interbasin 
water transfer are in most cases a “pipe dream” and that 
the taking of water from one river to another usually 
reﬂects ignorance of the social and environmental 
costs and a failure to adequately consider better, local 
alternatives, such a improved management of local 
demand.
1  Introduction
As the world faces increasing insecurity about its 
water supplies – with both droughts and ﬂoods on the 
increase - the world water crisis‘ effects are more and 
more frequently in the news. Climate change is now 
beginning to exacerbate water resources vulnerability. 
The planet urgently needs to face the dilemma of 
how to secure access to adequate water resources 
for expanding populations and economies, whilst 
maintaining healthy freshwater ecosystems and the vital 
services they provide (WWAP 2009), and in the context 
of climate change when the nature of water ﬂows can 
no longer be regarded as stationary (Milly et al. 2008). 
To those who see the worlds’ water balance as a score 
sheet of shortages and surpluses, one of the obvious 
solutions to meeting water demands is the transfer of 
water from areas with perceived surpluses, to those 
with shortages. While these so named ‘interbasin water 
transfers’ (IBTs) can potentially solve water supply 
issues in regions of water shortage – they come with 
signiﬁcant costs. 
Large scale IBT schemes are typically very high cost, 
and thus economically risky, and they usually also 
come with signiﬁcant social and environmental costs; 
usually for both the river basin providing and the river 
basin receiving the water. Climate-induced changes to 
hydrology now make these schemes more technically 
and economically risky.
The wide range of IBT projects in place, or proposed, 
provoked the preparation of our ﬁrst review in 2007, 
that is updated here to consider emerging issues 
and technologies in the debate on sustaining water 
resources and ecosystems in the face of climate change. 
We have looked to many previous assessments, ranging 
from those that looked upon transfer schemes only 
as an opportunity (Tecklaff 1967) to reviews that 
expressed increasing doubt and called for caution 
(Golubev and Biswas 1979; Biswas et al. 1983; USCID 
2001; Ghassemi and White 2007), and proposed 
criteria to assess the merits of proposed projects (Cox 
1999; WCD 2000; Gupta and van der Zaag 2008). It 
examines the costs and beneﬁts of large scale IBTs as 
a solution to water supply problems in the future, as 
well as analysing the lessons learnt from some existing 
schemes. 
The report also considers some proposed IBT 
schemes that have been under consideration for a 
number of years and that are today in various stages 
of development. These schemes are examined to 
establish if they are the best solution for addressing the 
problems they seek to solve. For each, the economic 
and environmental risks are identiﬁed and alternatives 
to the construction of the IBT are considered. 
The application of the trade in virtual water and 
also desalination as alternatives to IBTs is assessed. 
Further, we detail the implications of climate change 
for water management, and consider the role of water 
infrastructure in societal responses. This review 
concludes by setting out (in section 6) a decision-
making hierarchy or step-wise process by which any 
proposed IBTs can be reviewed to determine if they 
are truly needed, and to ensure that all other feasible 
alternatives have been considered before moving to the 
high risk strategy of constructing and operating an IBT 
scheme.
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2  Interbasin water transfers – the context
2.1  The escalating demands for water
Since the launch of the ﬁrst United Nations World 
Water Development Report (WWDR) ‘Water for 
People, Water for Life’ in 2003 the term ‘world water 
crisis’ has frequently made headlines. The report 
states “We are in the midst of a water crisis that has 
many faces. Whether concerning issues of health 
or sanitation, environment or cities, food, industry 
or energy production, the twenty-ﬁrst century is the 
century in which the overriding problem is one of water 
quality and management.” (WWAP 2003). 
Freshwater is vital to human survival and in general 
people have settled in areas with sustainable local water 
supplies. More than half the world’s assessable supplies 
of water are already diverted for human use (WWAP 
2003). Growing populations, increasing urbanisation 
and intensive agriculture result in over-exploitation 
of water resources and in many places human water 
use, domestic, industrial and agricultural, exceeds 
average annual water supplies. The WWDR notes 
that “Competition for water exists at all levels and is 
forecast to increase with demands for water in almost 
all countries. In 2030, 47% of world population will be 
living in areas of high water stress” WWAP 2009:150).
Areas of high water overuse tend to occur in regions 
that are strongly dependent on irrigated agriculture, 
such as the Indo-Gangetic Plain in South Asia, the 
North China Plain and the High Plains in North 
America. 
Seventy percent of global freshwater withdrawals are 
used for agriculture. Irrigation areas have doubled over 
the last ﬁfty years and are likely to continue increasing 
(IWMI 2007). Even though agricultural productivity 
has increased over time („more crop per drop“) its 
development presents a major threat of over-abstraction 
in many regions and is a major driver for planning and 
constructing IBTs. 
The growing urban concentration of water demand 
adds a highly localized dimension to these broader 
geographic trends. Where water use exceeds local 
supplies, society is often dependent on infrastructure, 
such as pipelines and canals, to transport water over 
long distances.  In conjunction with this, there is 
increasing reliance on groundwater extraction. 
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The consequences of water overuse include:
(i)  diminished river ﬂows;
(ii)  depletion of groundwater reserves triggering 
wider socio-economic impacts beyond 
hydrological ones;
(iii)  reduction of environmental ﬂows needed to 
sustain aquatic ecosystems and the associated 
services needed by people; 
(iv)  diminution and loss of livelihoods for the 
poorest in many societies;
(v)  societal conﬂict (e.g. Joy et al. 2007).
2.2  Impacts on freshwater ecosystems
The measures taken to secure adequate water supplies 
for human populations inevitably affect freshwater 
ecosystems. According to the WWF Living Planet 
Index (WWF, 2006a), populations of freshwater species 
showed a decline of over 30 per cent from 1970 to 
2003. This decline in freshwater species is attributed to 
factors such as (MEA 2005):
(i)  infrastructure development (like dams, inter 
and intra basin water transfers, canalization, 
ﬂood-control, river diversions and large-scale 
irrigation);
(ii)  deforestation; 
(iii)  over harvesting; 
(iv)  alien invasive species;
(v)  unsustainable agriculture practices (cultivating 
‘thirsty crops’); and,
(vi)  urban and industrial pollution. 
These drivers change the characteristic of river basins 
and their ecosystems in many ways. For example, dams 
interrupt the connectivity of river systems and therefore 
disrupt ﬁsh spawning and migration. Water transfers 
alter natural ﬂow regimes and ﬂuvial morphology, they 
reduce downstream water availability for agriculture 
and they contribute to salinization and water table 
lowering in coastal areas. They can also facilitate the 
transfer of invasive alien species within or between 
river basins.
The Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MEA 2005) 
states that “dams and other infrastructure fragment  
60 per cent of the large river systems in the world”. 
WWF estimates that of the world’s 177 large rivers 
(over 1 000 km long) only 21 remain free ﬂowing 
from source to sea (WWF, 2006b). Interbasin transfer 
Map 1: Fragmentation and ﬂow regulation by Large River System (LRS), (Nilsson et al, 2005)
Note: This ﬁgure presents the results of the river fragmentation and ﬂow regulation assessment by Nilsson et al., (2005). Of 292 of the world’s 
Large River Systems (LRS), 173 are either strongly or moderately affected by dams; while 119 are considered unaffected. In terms of areas, 
strongly affected systems constitute the majority (52 per cent or about 4 367 km2) of total LRS catchment areas. The grey colour represents 
potential LRSs in Indonesia and Malaysia that were not assessed due to lack of data.
2.3  Water Footprint and interbasin water 
transfers
Water footprinting is a key technique that can be used 
to assess peoples‘ reliance on distant water resources 
which are distributed both spatially and temporally. 
It is a measure of the impact on water resources as a 
result of our activities. In this report we elaborate on the 
application of water footprinting as a tool in the context 
of available alternatives to IBTs. This is a new addition 
as the concept is recently been developed since previous 
global assessments of IBTs have been undertaken, and it 
offers a new approach to managing water scarcity.
 
Water footprint is measured as the volume of water 
used in producing goods and services to support our 
consumption. A detailed water footprint analysis would 
reveal the complete supply chain of the goods and 
services and quantiﬁes different kinds of water used 
e.g. surface or ground water (blue water), effective use 
of rain (green water) and pollution impact on water 
resources (grey water) at different temporal and spatial 
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schemes have long been recognised as a major threat to 
river basin integrity and conservation due to (Davies et 
al. 1992), with impacts that include:
- loss of endemic biotas;
- introduction of invasive species;
- genetic intermixing of previously isolated 
populations;
- water quality degradation;
- drastic alteration of hydrological regimes;
- impacts on estuarine and marine processes;
- reduction in ﬁsheries; and
- spread of disease vectors.
Some of these impacts are assessed further in the case 
studies in this report.
scale. The water footprint shows human appropriation 
of the world‘s limited freshwater resources and thus 
provides a basis for assessing the impacts of goods 
and services on freshwater systems and formulating 
strategies to reduce those impacts (Hoekstra and 
Chapagain 2008).
 
The foundation of water footprint is the concept of 
virtual water, a term coined by Professor Tony Allan 
in early 1990s (Allan 1993; 1998) who recognised that 
importing wheat to the Middle East would be a way 
to relieve the pressure on scarcely available domestic 
water resources. The virtual water content of a product 
is deﬁned as the volume of water required to produce 
a commodity. When there is a transfer of products or 
services from one place to another, there is little direct 
physical transfer of water (except the real water content 
in the product which is quite insigniﬁcant in terms of 
quantity). There is often, however a signiﬁcant transfer 
of virtual water.
 
The traditional assessment of water demand in a 
region or a country is expressed as the sum of water 
withdrawals for different sectors in that region. This 
is merely a pseudo reﬂection of the real water demand 
of the region as the number is inﬂuenced by trade of 
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water intensive products. For example, Jordan imports 
a signiﬁcant proportion of agricultural products rather 
than producing domestically using its already scarce 
water resources. In this case, Jordan is withdrawing 
less water from within its territory, thus lowering its 
water demands from traditional point of view. However, 
the total volume of water used to produce goods and 
services consumed may not change signiﬁcantly. In 
other words, Jordan has, thus, externalised part of its 
water footprint to the regions from where it imports. 
Instead of importing water in virtual form, it could 
have chosen to be self sufﬁcient either by opting for 
desalination or real water transfers from nearby areas 
if feasible. This mechanism of re-locating the water 
footprint of a region to other areas is very relevant in 
analysing the alternatives to IBT projects.
3  What can we learn from existing interbasin water transfer schemes?
Interbasin water transfer schemes are not a new 
phenomenon (Shiklomanov 1999). Like the outbreak 
of dam building that marked the last half of the 1900s, 
interbasin water transfer are touted as the quick ﬁx 
solution to meeting escalating demands for water, to 
stoke the ﬁres of economic development, and to feed 
rapidly growing human populations. Globally, more 
that 364 large-scale water transfer schemes have been 
established that transfer around 400 km³ of water per 
year and one estimate suggests that the total number of 
large-scale water transfer schemes may rise to between 
760 and 1 240 by 2020 to transfer up to 800 km³ of 
water per year (Shiklomanov 1999).
Examining the impacts of existing IBTs is quite 
instructive. It provides signiﬁcant lessons we should 
learn as the pace with which new schemes are being 
formulated and brought forward for consideration 
quickens. 
Case study 1:   
Tagus-Segura Transfer - Spain
About this IBT ?
The Tagus-Segura IBT in Spain is a 286 km long 
pipeline connecting four different Spanish river 
basins; the Tagus, Júcar, Segura and Guadiana. It was 
approved before democratic government with no public 
discussion of the beneﬁts and impacts of the proposal, 
and has been operative since 1978. 
Its main objective was to solve an estimated water 
deﬁcit of 0.5 km3/yr in the recipient area of Alicante, 
Murcia and Almeria provinces, to ensure water 
supply for 147 000 hectares of irrigation and 76 
municipalities in south-east Spain. The pipeline starts at 
the Entrepenas and Buendia dams in the Upper Tagus, 
with a storage capacity of approximately 2.4 km3, and 
facilitates a transfer of 1 km3/yr towards the Talave 
Dam in the Segura River basin. 
Interbasin transfers - planned, completed 
or being conceived - number in the 
hundreds. No river basin is immune 
it seems from the easy attraction of 
becoming a donor or recipient basin. 
Transfer schemes run the gamut: Japan’s 
Totsukawa to Kinokawa River, Chile’s 
Teno-Chimbarango Canal, France’s 
Durance River project, Morocco’s Beri 
Boussa project and on and on.
The diversion of the Aral Sea tributaries 
with a disastrous outcome is one of the 
best known schemes for all the wrong 
reasons: salinity, water and ﬁsh decline 
and health problems. Big or small, 
transfer schemes are often expensive, 
elaborate, and unsustainable ways that 
complicate, not solve, water problems. 
The following pages describe three cases 
of existing IBTs followed by four cases 
in the works.
Map 2: Schematic representation of the Tagus-Segura IBT 
Source: Website of the Segura Basin Management Agency (www.chsegura.es)
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The legal approval for the scheme requires that 
only surplus waters from the Targus River may be 
transferred (Law 21/1971). Project designers based 
their calculations in an abnormally humid hydrological 
period and estimated that 1.4 km3/yr of water would be 
available. However, climate and land use changes in the 
upper Tagus basin have resulted in a reduction of 47% 
in average streamﬂow over the past 40 years (Estevan 
et al. 2007). In the initial phase, a maximum transfer 
of only 0.6 km³/yr was approved and infrastructures 
were built to this capacity. Further infrastructure 
development in the upper Tagus was proposed for 
an additional 0.4 km3/yr however actual average 
streamﬂows of 0.76 km3/yr have made the second phase 
of the project unviable. The actual transfers are variable 
and are usually only around 0.2-0.4 km3 per year. On 
only one occasion (1999-2000 hydrologic year) has the 
maximum amount of 0.6 km3 been reached. Transfer 
volumes are authorized by the Tagus-Segura Transfer 
Central Management Commission, in response to 
requests from users. When water storage in the Tagus 
dams falls below 0.24 km³, transfers must be approved 
by the national government through the Council of 
Ministers.
A total of 9.8 km3 of water has been transferred in the 
30 years the IBT has been operative. Of this, 5.9 km3 
(60%) has been used to complement supply almost 
200 000 ha of irrigated agriculture in the Murcia and 
Alicante provinces; 3.7 km3 (38%) to complement 
drinking water supply for over two million people in 
Murcia, Alicante and Almería; and about 0.2 km3 has 
been used to transfer water to the Tablas de Damiel 
National Park, a wetland ecosystem in the Guadiana 
River basin.
In addition to the planned water transfers, irrigators 
in the Segura basin have taken advantage of a 2001 
modiﬁcation of Spanish water law that allows for 
purchase of water rights. Starting in 2005 they have 
bought water from irrigators in Aranjuez and Estremera 
in the Tagus River basin and delivered it via the Tagus-
Segura infrastructure. While these transfers have been 
approved an evaluation of the environmental impacts 
on the Tagus basin was not incorporated. 
In 2008 construction started on a new infrastructure 
that will take water from the main Tagus-Segura 
channel to the Mancha plains in the Castilla-La Mancha 
autonomous region in south-central Spain. The goal is 
to transfer an additional 0.05 km3/yr to secure urban 
water supplies for 58 municipalities. The estimated 
total cost of the infrastructure is € 270.5 million, largely 
from EU funds.
Analysis:
The design of the Tagus-Segura IBT was based on 
a signiﬁcant overestimation of available water from 
the donor basin and consequently the scheme has 
had serious social, economic and environmental 
consequences in both the donor and the recipient 
basins. 
From an economic standpoint, the Tagus-Segura IBT 
set a precedent in Spain where beneﬁciaries were 
supposed to pay for the infrastructure and operational 
costs of the transferred waters. Further, part of the 
income generated from water use fees was to be 
transferred to donor regions in compensation (Law 
52/1980). The user fees have ﬁxed and variable cost 
components. However, since only the ﬁrst phase of 
the project was built the ﬁxed portion of the fee only 
covers 60% of total construction costs. Additionally, 
ﬁxed costs are in proportion to the maximum volume 
that can be transferred (0.6 km3/yr) and users pay only 
the portion that they actually receive, which is usually 
signiﬁcantly lower. Water losses en route, estimated at 
about 15%, are subsidized by the state and not paid for 
by the users. Finally, in times of drought the water users 
have been repeatedly exempt from payment of fees 
in order to compensate them for potential economic 
losses. As a result users have paid for less than 30% 
of total costs and donor regions have consequently 
received lower compensations.
In the recipient basin, rather than solving a water 
shortage, the extensive water infrastructure has 
become a driver for unsustainable use of water, 
fostering uncontrolled increases in irrigated areas 
and urban development on the coast. According to 
Martínez and Esteve (2002), the original plan was for 
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this IBT to guarantee supply to 90 000 ha existing 
irrigated agriculture, and convert an additional 50 000 
ha to irrigation. However, the expectation of large 
volumes of transferred water has fostered uncontrolled 
expansion of irrigation and newly irrigated area has 
grown to nearly 88 000 ha, despite annual ﬂows from 
the IBT being around one-third of those projected.
Moreover, the construction of the IBT has fostered 
a proliferation of illegal boreholes, to manage the 
ﬂuctuating water supplies from the IBT, contributing 
to overexploitation of the aquifers. As a result, the 
IBT has multiplied the initial ‘water deﬁcit’ that it was 
supposed to solve and has created a strong dependence 
of the economy in the recipient region on the IBT.
From an environmental standpoint, although the IBT 
was based on a supposed water surplus, the Tagus basin 
has been substantially impacted. Legal minimum stream 
ﬂow requirements have not been met. The management 
rules have not been modiﬁed in the 30 years the scheme 
has been operational to reﬂect current hydrological 
conditions. As a result, the Entrepeñas and Buendía 
reservoirs are managed to maximize transfers to the 
Segura basin and not to provide stream ﬂows or meet 
other demands in the Tagus basin. 
Over the past 30 years up to 70% of the Tagus 
headwater ﬂows have been transferred to the Segura 
basin. The reduced stream ﬂows have degraded the 
ecological status, and affected riparian vegetation along 
the Tagus River. Lower stream ﬂows have aggravated 
water quality problems in diminishing the dilution 
of insufﬁciently treated efﬂuents from urban centers, 
particularly from greater Madrid (6 million inhabitants). 
Further, the lack of access to Tagus headwaters has 
Photo 1: The Tagus in Talavera de la Reina (0 m3/s) in July 2006, 
while over 20 m3/s were being transferred to the Segura basin
increased pressure on western Tagus River tributaries, 
particularly to supply water to Madrid’s growing 
population and economy.
The new Tagus River basin management plan currently 
being developed must balance diminished resources, 
the impacts of climate change, the need to establish and 
guarantee an ecologically-sound stream ﬂow regime, 
as well as meeting priority demands in the Tagus 
River basin. The pressure of the Tagus-Segura IBT 
on the Tagus River makes it difﬁcult to achieve good 
ecological status as required by 2015 by the European 
Union’s Water Framework Directive. In this context, it 
is questionable whether the plan will be able to justify 
existence of surplus waters to transfer.
In the recipient basins, the increase in illegal irrigation 
in expectation of new water supplies has resulted in 
the occupation and destruction for agriculture of areas 
of high ecological value. The expansion of irrigated 
agriculture has created signiﬁcant eutrophication 
problems in the Mar Menor Lagoon Ramsar site. The 
scheme also impacts endemic ﬁsh species in the Segura 
River. For instance, the transfer of species between the 
basins is threatening through hybridisation the minnow 
(Chondrostoma arrigonis), which is endemic in the 
Júcar River and listed as a critically endangered species 
(IUCN Red List 2006).
From a social standpoint, the IBT has become a 
major catalyst for conﬂicts between the donor and 
recipient regions. Improved demand management in 
the recipient area through the closing down of illegal 
wells, preventing the creation of new irrigated areas 
and promoting more sustainable urban land use, would 
help to reduce these tensions. In a region where 80% of 
water is used for irrigation the focus should remain on 
the agricultural sector.
In 2004 the Ministry of the Environment launched an 
ambitious plan to diversify the sources of water in the 
Mediterranean regions through increased wastewater 
treatment and reuse, improved water efﬁciency in 
irrigation and urban areas, and the development of 
desalination plants to increase supply. The A.G.U.A. 
program, anticipates that in 2015 desalination will 
provide up to 0.4 km3/yr in the Segura River basin, 
which would be sufﬁcient to meet urban water demand 
in the region. In spite of these initiatives, the draft 
documents for the Segura basin management plan 
continue to emphasize transfer and purchase of water. 
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The reality of diminished river ﬂows in the upper 
Tagus and the increasing demands for environmental 
ﬂows are resulting in signiﬁcant pressure from 
regional governments and interest groups in recipient 
regions to maintain the existing scheme and consider 
a new Tagus-Segura ITB. The new scheme would 
transfer water from the Medium Tagus in Valdecañas 
(Extremadura), near Portugal, but the economic, social 
and environmental viability of this new project is yet 
to be proven. Authorities in the Murcia region have 
regularly organized public demonstrations where 
hundreds of thousands of citizens are called to the 
streets to defend what they perceive to be their right 
to Tagus waters (Estevan et al. 2007; Fernandez and 
Selma 2002; Perez 2008).
At the same time, a citizen movement (www.redtajo.
es) formed from 2007 in the Tagus basin in Spain and 
Portugal that advocates more sustainable and rational 
management of the Tagus River and its tributaries. The 
drying up of the river in Talavera de la Reina and other 
major urban centers in the summer of 2006 while over 
Summary:
Where Tagus – Segura Transfer, Spain
When 1978 completed
Receiving basin Segura, Jucar and Guadiana basins
Donating basin Tagus (upstream)
Distance 286 km main pipe
Volume diverted 0.6 km3/yr
Structures 5 dams, 286 km pipe, network of post-transfer distribution
Cost Not known
Purposes Irrigation
Urban water supply
Environmental 
cost/beneﬁts
Reduction in stream ﬂow in donor basin
Increased threat level for critically endangered ﬁsh species
Social costs/
beneﬁts
Social conﬂicts
Increase of water consumption
Increase in agricultural production in the receiving basins
Alternatives? Close down illegal wells and irrigation
Promote sustainable urban land use
Increase use of desalinated water
Restrict new irrigation development
Recycle wastewater
Lessons learnt Increasing water availability from an IBT can become a driver for unsustainable water use 
in the receiving area
IBTs should be accompanied by strict measures to curb water demand in the receiving area
20 m3/s was being transferred to the Segura basin, the 
loss of traditional swimming river beaches in Toledo, 
Aranjuez and Talavera, and the poor water quality 
along the river were major catalysts for this movement. 
In June 2009 50 000 people gathered in Talavera de 
la Reina from all over the Tagus basin to defend their 
right to clean water and healthy 
Photo 2: Public demonstration in defense of the Tagus River in 
Talavera de la Reina
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Case study 2:   
Snowy River Scheme - Australia
About this IBT:
The Great Dividing Range in south-eastern Australia is 
an important source of water, including for the Snowy 
River, which drains to the south-east. The prospect of 
damming the Snowy River, and diverting its waters 
to the western side of the Great Divide into the River 
Murray basin for the dual purpose of hydropower and 
irrigation, dates back to 1884. 
The scheme was eventually constructed by the national 
and two state governments (Victoria and New South 
Wales) at a cost of AUD $ 820 million (US$ 630 mil-
lion) between 1949 and 1974 and comprises 16 large 
dams, seven hydropower stations, over 145 km of 
tunnels and about 80 km of aqueducts, mostly located 
in Kosciuszko National Park (Wright 1999; Ghassemi 
and White 2007; Snowy Hydro 2007). The scheme has 
a total water storage capacity of 7 km3 and electricity 
generating capacity of 3 756 MW, 16% of the total 
capacity in south-east Australia. 
Map 3:  
The Snowy Mountains 
Hydro-electric Scheme 
is an integrated water 
and hydro-electric power 
scheme. It collects 
and stores the water 
that would normally 
ﬂow east to the coast 
and diverts it through 
trans-mountain tunnels 
and power stations. The 
water is then released 
into the Murray and 
Murrumbidgee Rivers 
for irrigation.
Sixteen major dams, 
seven power stations 
(two underground), a 
pumping station, 145 
kms of inter-connected 
trans-mountain 
tunnels and 80 kms 
of aqueducts were 
constructed.
Source: http://www.
snowyhydro.com.
au/kids_pop.asp
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Analysis:
The scheme has yielded substantial economic beneﬁts, 
as apart from hydropower, in a year with average 
rainfall it diverts 1.1 km3/yr of water into the Murray-
Darling Basin for irrigation; resulting in an estimated 
US$ 115 - 145 million per year of value added. 
The scheme has also facilitated access for recreation 
and tourism attractions (3 million visitors per year) by 
roads servicing the scheme (estimated at about US$ 
118 million a year), as well as associated employment 
opportunities.
However, the environmental impacts on the Snowy 
River have been severe. It’s ﬂow was reduced to 1% 
of natural; this resulting in a loss of ﬂoodplain wetland 
habitats; silting up of the river channel and invasion 
by exotic trees, salt water intrusion into the estuary 
and loss of migratory ﬁsh populations. Downstream 
communities have suffered from a loss of tourism.
When the government owners of the scheme moved 
to corporatize the Snowy Mountains Hydroelectric 
Corporation, as a possible prelude to privatization 
(since abandoned in 2006), residents downstream 
on the Snowy River demanded that river ﬂows were 
restored ﬁrst. They feared that if these ﬂows were 
proposed after corporatization the compensation 
payable to the scheme owners for loss of income from 
electricity generation, sales of water to irrigators and in 
renovating infra¬structure, would be prohibitive. 
The demand to restore the Snowy created conﬂict 
with the downstream states and communities along 
the Murray River, which receives water diverted by 
the Snowy scheme. The Murray River has 80% of its 
average annual ﬂow diverted for irrigation. Apart from 
possible impact on irrigation, any reduction of water 
threatened to accelerate the environmental collapse 
of the Murray River and its many services, including 
Ramsar Convention-listed Wetlands of International 
Importance. 
A vocal community campaign led to a public inquiry. 
During this, scientists estimated that restoring the 
Snowy River’s ﬂow to 28% was the minimum required 
to restore the most damaged portion of the river to a 
more natural condition and re-establish ﬁsh populations 
(SSC 2008). In 2002 the national and state governments 
signed an agreement to undo part of the water transfers 
to partly restore ﬂows to the Snowy River and other 
dammed Alpine streams. The targets for the Snowy 
River are to return ﬂows to 15% (0.14 km3/yr) of natural 
in years 1-7, to 21% (0.21 km3/yr) in years 7-10, and, 
under certain conditions, up to 28% (0.29 km3/yr) after 
year 10 (The Commonwealth of Australia et al. 2002). 
The governments involved allocated AUD $ 375 million 
(US$ 289 million) to the ‘Water for Rivers’ company 
to secure 0.28 km3/yr water for environmental releases 
(0.21 km3/yr for the Snowy to restore ﬂows to 21%, 
and 0.07 km3/yr for the Murray). This is largely being 
sought through investing in water savings projects to 
compensate for the reduction of water supply into the 
Murray-Darling Basin. As of July 2009 0.20 km3 of 
annual water entitlements had been secured (Water 
for Rivers 2009). In practice these ‘water savings’ are 
proving difﬁcult to deliver and some repurchase of 
water entitlements is now being undertaken. 
The Jindabyne Dam could not release the increased 
environmental ﬂow to the Snowy River, and so a 
new outlet, spillway and hydroelectric plant has been 
retroﬁtted to the dam at a cost of AUD $ 90 million 
(US$ 69 million). For 2009/10 instead of the targeted 
of 15% annual natural ﬂow, only 4% has been allocated 
by the New South Wales Government, which the New 
South Wales Government blames on drought reducing 
water entitlements (SSC 2008; DWE 2009; SRA 2009). 
Government delays in implementing key aspects of 
the agreement, poor governance and the reluctance of 
Snowy Hydro appear to be contributing to the poor 
outcomes to date.
The future of the Snowy Mountains Scheme is 
now linked to the impacts of climate change. The 
Australian Government’s climate change advisor 
has recommended privatising and re-engineering the 
scheme to store excess wind and solar power for use 
at peak times. The Garnaut Climate Change Review 
said (Garnaut 2008:477): “power from intermittent 
sources at times of low demand and price could be 
used to pump water into hydroelectric storage for use at 
times of greater demand and value. Public ownership, 
and in the case of Snowy Hydro ownership by three 
governments, has applied constraints on the supply of 
capital to the optimisation of the value of these major 
national assets. These constraints have high opportunity 
costs in the emerging environment. It is important that 
they be removed.” By contrast, the drought that has 
grown since 2002 has seen the Snowy Hydro Scheme’s 
power generation fall dramatically, so much so that 
Snowy Hydro has purchased natural gas peaking plants 
to maintain supplies (Snowy Hydro 2007). The forecast 
declines in precipitation and runoff in the Australian 
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Alps, which range from +7 to -24% with a median 
estimate of -12% (CSIRO 2008), has led many to 
suggest that the current drought represent a step change 
in the climate, which may jeopardise the future of the 
hydro scheme. Headlines in The Canberra Times on 5 
and 7 July 2009 concerning the Snowy Scheme stated: 
“The gold rush that was fed by water is over,” “When 
the rivers don’t run,” and “Hydro scheme threatened.”
Summary:
Where Snowy River Scheme, Australia
When From 1949 until now
Receiving basin Murray-Darling Basin
Donating basin Snowy River
Distance Less than 100 km
Volume diverted 1.1 km3/yr of water into the Murray-Darling Basin for irrigation
Structures 16 large dams, seven hydropower stations, over 145 km of tunnels and about 80 km of 
aqueducts
Cost AUD $ 820 million (US$ 630 million; AUD $ 9 billion in 2002 prices) 
Purposes Hydropower
Irrigation
Environmental 
cost/beneﬁts
Snowy River reduced to 1% of its natural ﬂow, resulting in loss of wetland habitat, silting 
up of the river channel, invasion by exotic trees, salt water intrusion in the estuary and loss 
of migratory ﬁsh populations.
Diverted water has helped (in part) to retain ecological values of Ramsar wetlands and the 
river channel of the recipient river, the Murray; a grossly over-allocated system.
Social costs/
beneﬁts
For the communities of the Snowy River the costs were loss of income, amenity values and 
a natural asset.
Communities of the recipient River Murray beneﬁted, especially irrigators. The IBT 
created signiﬁcant employment locally, was seen as a nation building project, which 
generates electricity and has opened up the region to tourism
Alternatives? Electricity generation was possible without the IBT diverting water from the Snowy River, 
which was seen at that time as expendable in the national interest.
More efﬁcient irrigation practices along the recipient river could have allowed an 
expansion of agriculture without the IBT.
Increasing the share virtual water in meeting part of the food demands could have reduced 
the demand for real water.
Lessons learnt Projects that don’t adequately consider the full costs and beneﬁts, including on natural 
assets, and their associated communities, cause conﬂict for decades. 
Even partial restoration of diverted ﬂows is very expensive. Upfront provision of 
environmental ﬂows would have signiﬁcantly reduced the costs.
No consideration was given to demand management (improved water use efﬁciencies) in 
the recipient basin at the time the IBT was devised.
Altered hydrology due to climate change now threatens the delivery of services from the 
Snowy Mountains Scheme. 
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Case study 3:   
Lesotho Highland Water Project  
- Lesotho and South Africa
About this IBT:
The Lesotho Highlands Water Project (LHWP) is a 
multi-billion dollar water transfer and hydropower 
project implemented by the governments of Lesotho 
and South Africa, and is one of Africa’s largest water-
resource developments. It is envisaged to eventually 
comprise six major dams (four phases), and associated 
infrastructure, on the headwaters of the Senqu River in 
Lesotho, which becomes the Orange River as it crosses 
into South Africa (Figure 1). Water is the principal 
natural resource of Lesotho and its mountains generate 
nearly 50% of the total run-off of the Orange River, 
although they constitute only 5% of the total area of the 
Senqu/Orange Basin.
The LHWP was formalised in 1986 through the signing 
of ‘The Treaty’ between Lesotho and South Africa. 
Construction began on the ﬁrst of four phases in the 
early 1990s, and the ﬁrst dam, Katse Dam (Full Supply 
Level [FSL] capacity: 1.95 km³/yr, was completed in 
1998 (Phase IA). A second dam, Mohale Dam (FSL 
capacity: 0.95 km³/yr), and a diversion weir, Matsoku 
Weir, followed in 2004 (Phase IB). Muela Hydropower 
Plant, which was also built as part of Phase I, provides 
a major part of Lesotho’s electricity demands (Tromp 
2006). Phase II was approved for construction in 2008 
and deliveries of water to South Africa are expected to 
commence in 2019 or 2020. Phase II comprises a dam 
at Polihali2 (FSL capacity: 1.89 km³/yr) on the upper 
Senqu River (Tanner et al. 2009), with a tunnel to Katse 
Dam. 
Map 4: The location and layout 
of the Lesotho Highlands Water 
Project (Odendaal 2007). 
2 Originally, Phase II was a dam on the Senqu River at Mashai but 
this was moved upstream to Polihali during the pre-feasibility studies 
in 2007.
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In terms of The Treaty, South Africa will buy a 
stipulated annual supply of water, thereby generating 
export revenue for Lesotho. Phase I currently transfers 
0.60 km3/yr (www.lhwp.org.ls) to South Africa. 
Payments for Phase I alone are 14% of Lesotho’s Gross 
Domestic Product for the next 50 years (e.g., 14.7% 
in 2008; www.lhwp.org.ls). Polihali Dam is expected 
to double the annual volume transferred to South 
Africa (1.20 km³/yr; Tanner et al. 2009). If all four of 
the envisaged phases are developed, the total yield of 
the LHWP is expected to be in excess of 2.0 km³/yr 
(Odendaal 2007), which would generate annual royalty 
payments to Lesotho of about US$ 100 million.
Estimated costs for Phase I vary between US$ 2.1 
billion (Watson 2008) and US$ 3.5 billion (Horta 
2007), and were considerably more than originally 
predicted (Tromp 2006). The expected cost of Phase II 
is in the region of US$ 1 billion (Tanner et al. 2009), 
and the costs for all phases are expected to be about 
US$ 8 billion (Gleick 1998); double the original 
estimates.
Consideration and provisions for mitigation of 
environmental and social impacts associated with the 
LHWP were poor in the initial phases of the LHWP. 
Phase IA, for instance, began before completion of 
a full environmental Impact assessment report3, and 
work on the downstream impacts only started after 
the completion of Katse Dam. The Lesotho Highlands 
Development Authority together with the World Bank 
made a considerable effort to rectify this in subsequent 
stages of the project, with some success. 
Analysis:
From an environmental perspective, Phase I of the 
LHWP inundated over 100 km of pristine, large, 
mountain-river habitat, and seriously threatened 
the reaches downstream. In 2003, following an 
Environmental Flow (EF) assessment (King et al. 
2000), an Instream Flow Requirement (IFR) Policy was 
ﬁnalized by LHDA (2003), which speciﬁed EF releases, 
operating rules for the dams and a program to monitor 
compliance. The operating rules make provision for 
changes to releases depending on climatic conditions, 
so that some natural variation is maintained. Treaty 
provisions for 5% of the natural mean annual runoff to 
be released as a constant ﬂows from Phase I structures 
were increased to 10% and 14% from Katse and 
3 Although more than 20 social and environmental studies were done 
(Tromp 2006) most of these post-dated project initiation.
Mohale Dams, respectively (LHWP 2003). EF were 
included in the feasibility studies for Phase II and in the 
yield determination for Polihali Dam (done in 2008), 
the long term average EF allocations were modelled at 
130 million m3/yr, about 18.7% of the average natural 
mean annual inﬂow of 697 million m3/yr (Tanner et 
al. 2009). Polihali Dam will, however, result in an 
as-yet-unknown cumulative reduction in ﬂows in the 
Senqu River, which already has reduced ﬂows as a 
result of Phase I. The ‘target ecological conditions’ for 
the rivers immediately downstream of the dams are 
thus lower than their pre-dam condition, and despite 
a commitment to compensation, not all of the losses 
incurred could be costed or even compensated for 
(Brown 2008). Downstream, in South Africa, it is likely 
that harvesting of clean source water will have impacts 
in the lower Orange River, where water-resource 
developments and water-quality issues in the Vaal and 
middle Orange Rivers have already taken their toll 
(Binedell et al. 2005). The condition of the receiving 
river in South Africa, the Ash River, has also been 
seriously compromised through erosion and associated 
river engineering works.
Although there was considerable improvement in 
the scope and budget for environmental studies, 
implementation has been inconsistent. Initial problems 
with EF releases are still being ironed out. The ﬁrst IFR 
audit, completed in 2007, found that implementation 
had been 60% compliant with the IFR Policy and 
identiﬁed issues likely to affect the sustainability of 
the process (INR 2007). Tardy implementation of, 
and in some cases disregard for, recommendations 
was probably responsible for some of the more 
emotive environmental impacts, such as those to the 
critically-endangered Maloti minnow (Pseudobarbus 
quathlambae), which are now under threat from 
smallmouth yellowﬁsh (Labeobarbus aeneus) that have 
been able to access previously inaccessible tributaries 
via LHWP infrastructure. Although both are indigenous 
to Lesotho, these two species do not (and quite possibly 
cannot) coexist naturally (Southern Waters 2006). 
From a social perspective, Phase I of the LHWP either 
directly or indirectly affected some 180 000 people, 
although the bulk of these people lived along the Senqu 
River and were not seriously affected by Phase I (King 
et al. 2000). In Phase IA around 30 000 people were 
directly affected by the construction works and 325 
households had to be permanently relocated. About  
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2 300 ha of valuable agricultural land and 3 400 ha of 
pastures were lost. The numbers were slightly lower 
in the case of Phase IB, and are likely to be lower still, 
but by no means insigniﬁcant, in Phase II, which is 
situated in a less-densely populated area of the country. 
Alteration of ﬂow regimes in the downstream rivers 
may eventually affect about 150 000 people in Lesotho 
alone (King et al. 2000), although as mentioned, for 
Phase I the bulk of these impacts are restricted to the 
Malibamatso and Senqunyane Rivers. (No assessment 
has been done of the social effects in South Africa). 
LHDA has a policy of compensation for loss of 
arable land and loss of riverine resources. The annual 
compensation for lost arable land in the form of cash or 
grain with pulses for 2004 comprised c. US$ 65 000.00, 
c. 14 000 maize bags and c. 30 000 kg of pulses, which 
were distributed among c. 3 000 households (LHDA 
2005). The ﬁrst lump sum payments to compensate 
for predicted downstream losses in river reaches close 
to Phase I structures (within 60 km; included 6 965 
households), which totalled about US$ 27 million, 
were also paid into community trust accounts in 2004 
(LHDA 2005). For the more distal reaches, these 
payments will be made if monitoring indicated a loss 
has indeed occurred (LHDA 2003).
The compensation payments notwithstanding, criticism 
continues to be levelled at the LHDA mainly because 
many of the concerns related to Phase IA were either 
not rectiﬁed, only rectiﬁed after considerable delays 
(in some cases 10 years) or were repeated in Phase 
IB (e.g., Thamae and Pottinger 2006), and there have 
been reports of slow and inadequate compensation. 
In its initial stages, the project was also plagued by 
corruption but the authorities have since successfully 
prosecuted many of the accused. The former Chief 
Executive of LHDA is in jail, two engineering ﬁrms 
were convicted of bribery (TRC 2005) and the 
Government has recouped millions of dollars from 
convicted consulting ﬁrms (www.LHWP.org.ls). 
Lesotho has gained immense economic beneﬁts from 
the LHWP with over US$ 300 million in royalties 
(Jan 1998 - April 2009) since water delivery to 
South Africa began in 1998 (http://www.lhwp.org.
ls/Reports/PDF/Water%20Sales.pdf). The country is 
also now self-sufﬁcient in power generation. Project-
related roads, bridges, power lines and substations, 
and telecommunications, and ancillary developments 
(schools, clinics, water supply), have greatly improved 
access, communications and community infrastructure 
in the highlands (Tromp 2006). Tourist numbers in the 
highlands, although still low, have improved noticeably 
(Tromp 2006). The employment and capacity-building 
opportunities offered by the project have also been 
signiﬁcant, and include employment by LHDA, 
construction-related employment and consulting 
opportunities. For instance, Phase IB provided 13 000 
person years of employment, of which 40% were from 
the Highlands, and generated income of c. US$ 25 mil-
lion in fees to Basotho consultants4 (Tromp 2006).
There are however concerns that the poorest have 
not seen the beneﬁts of the project, and the bad press 
deservedly attracted by the project at its outset lingers 
on. In particular, this relates to: the investigation of 
4 As opposed to US$ 18 million in Phase IA.
Photo 3: The gorge on the Senqu River downstream of Tsoelike is 
just one of the reaches that would be inundated by Phase IV of the 
LHWP. © Cate Brown
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viable alternatives, resettlement of communities, the 
compensation for lost assets and governance issues. 
There are also serious concerns that the LHWP is 
somewhat of a juggernaut, which will not stop until all 
four phases5 have been completed, despite its inevitable 
5 A ﬁfth phase, comprising a dam on the lower Senqunyane River, has 
also been proposed.
Summary:
Where Lesotho / South Africa: Lesotho Highlands Water Project
When Conceived in 1950s and formalised in 1986 through the signing of ‘The Treaty’ between 
Lesotho and South Africa. Planned as four phases, Phase I was completed in 2003, and Phase 
II was approved for construction in 2008
Receiving 
basin
Vaal River, which is part of the Orange River Basin.
Donating basin Senqu/Orange River.
Distance c. 200 km of tunnel.
Volume 
diverted
c. 0.6 km3/yr (Phase I only).
Cost Phase I: US$ 2.1-3.5 billion. 
Phase II: US$ 1 billion. 
Total: US$ 8 billion.
Purposes Water supply for South Africa’s Gauteng industry region;
Electricity, royalties and infrastructure for Lesotho.
Environmental 
cost/beneﬁts
Reduced, more constant ﬂows and less-frequent ﬂoods in the Malibamatso, Senqu and 
Senqunyane Rivers;
Reduction in river ecosystem health;
Treat to survival of the critically-endangered Maloti minnow;
Excessive erosion in the receiving Ash River in South Africa.
Social costs/
beneﬁts
The project created signiﬁcant employment locally, and was seen as a nation building project; 
Lesotho is now self-sufﬁcient in power generation; 
Signiﬁcant rise in government revenues, with knock-on beneﬁts linked to social spending;
Increased tourism to the highlands;
When completed will dispossess more than 30 000 (now about 20 000) rural farmers of 
cost/beneﬁts assets (including homes, ﬁelds, and grazing lands) and deprive many of their 
livelihoods;
The loss of arable and gazing land would increase Lesotho’s dependence on foreign food 
imports.
Alternatives? The Tugela Water Project in KwaZulu, Natal was investigated as an alternative to Phase II of 
the LHWP;
Water demand management in Gauteng;
Water reuse and recycling;
Virtual water imports to meet part of the water demands.
Lessons learnt Failure to investigate and adequately address social and environmental impacts at the outset 
of a project can lead to prolonged negative impressions of the project;
The capital costs for these types of projects are frequently much greater than the proponents 
ﬁrst claim, as was the case here (WCD 2000);. Dam costs are often underestimated because 
they fail to account for all the economic costs of the project (Watson 2008);
Poor governance can lead to poor decisions and greater costs, as shown by the allegations of 
corruption.
and devastating impacts on the long-term sustainability 
of the Orange River system, or the fact that it would 
see nearly 80% of the length of Lesotho’s major rivers 
dammed.
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Conclusions – lessons learnt
The preceding case studies describing IBT schemes 
from three different parts of the World illustrate well 
a number of the common, negative impacts of these 
schemes. The table below summarises these. 
Negative impacts of IBT
Case study
1. Tagus-Segura 
Transfer, Spain
2. Snowy River, 
Australia
3. Lesotho Highlands 
Water Project, Lesotho 
and South Africa
Demand management in recipient 
basin not serious part of pre-planning 
for IBT, leading to on-going water 
wastage
IBT became driver for unsustainable 
water use in recipient basin– irrigation 
and urban
● ● -
Created strong dependence on IBT in 
recipient community
● ● ●
IBT now seen as inadequate and 
other water supplementation required 
(groundwater, desalinisation, recycling 
etc)
● ● -
Saw proliferation of boreholes to 
access groundwater – leading to over-
exploitation of this resource too
● - -
Donor basin experienced serious 
environmental impacts through 
reduced ﬂows especially
● ● ●
IBT created or escalated threats to 
critically endangered, threatened 
species etc
● - ●
Scheme saw economic beneﬁts 
in recipient basin at the cost of 
communities in the donor basin
● ● ●
IBT catalyst for social conﬂict 
between donor and recipient basins or 
with government
● ● -
IBT has not helped the situation of the 
poor affected or displaced by it - - ●
Post IBT mitigation costs very high, 
either environmentally or socially
● ● ●
Governance arrangements for IBT 
weak, resulting in budget blow-out or 
corruption
- - ●
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From the above there are several key lessons that can 
be learned, as follows:
1. Before progressing to commission an IBT, 
there should be a comprehensive assessment 
of the alternatives available for providing the 
water needed in the proposed recipient basin. 
Can this water be provided through demand 
management, water recycling, water harvesting 
etc, before considering a major infrastructure 
investment with its inevitable environmental 
and social impacts? Or, is there an alternative 
to meet the demands by re-distributing the 
water footprints to regions with water surpluses 
(transferring virtual water rather than real water 
across river basins)?
2. Undertake a cost-beneﬁt analysis of the 
likely impacts of the IBT on both the donor 
and recipient basins, considering the full 
range of environmental, social and economic 
implications.
3. Ensure risks associated with the proposed IBT 
- environmental, social and economic - are 
clearly understood, and if the project proceeds, 
governance arrangements are adequate to 
manage and minimise these risks.
4. Undertake consultations with the likely 
directly and indirectly affected people, before 
a decision is taken regarding the possible 
IBT (and certainly before it becomes fait 
accompli) ensuring they understand and have 
the opportunity to voice views on likely cost, 
beneﬁts and risks.
Note that such approach is advocated as a ‘needs and 
options’ assessment in the report of the WCD (2000) 
and is addressed in the Section I of the Sustainability 
Assessment Protocol (HSAF 2009). 
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4  In the pipeline – interbasin water transfers in the future
Despite numerous less than positive experiences with 
large scale interbasin water transfers, many decision 
makers are today still looking toward them as a solution 
to water supply problems within their country. 
Many ambitious projects are under consideration at 
present. This includes a number of schemes that will 
transfer water over thousands of kilometres, as well as 
many other schemes that are less grand in scale.
Globally there is no single, reliable source of 
information on the numbers and kinds of IBTs 
that are planned; most schemes being developed 
within countries. The major sources of information 
on proposed large IBTs assembled for this report 
include UNESCO (Cox 1999), academic assessments 
(Shiklomanov 1999; Lasserre, 2005; Ghassemi and 
White 2007; Gupta and van der Zaag 2008) and the 
International Commission on Irrigation and Drainage 
(ICID 2006). 
In some countries plans exist to not just transfer water 
from one basin to another, but to transfer water across 
many river basins. Plans for IBTs are also not limited to 
countries that as yet have no negative experiences with 
them. Proponents in Australia for example, despite the 
vast amounts of money being spent on restoring some 
of the ﬂows in the Snowy River system (see case study 
2 in section 3), still have plans for large water supply 
schemes (Ghassemi and White 2007).
This report examines this issue further through the 
following four case studies of proposed transfer 
schemes from all over the world. 
Case study 4:  Acheloos Diversion, Greece
Why an IBT ?
The 220 km long Acheloos River originates in the 
Pindos mountain range and runs southwards through 
Western Greece to the Ionian Sea. The upper reaches 
of the river are developed for hydro-electricity at the 
Kastraki and Kremasta dams, but there are plans to 
divert its waters eastwards to the Thessaly plains, an 
important agricultural region. 
The diversion plans date back to the 1930s, but 
concrete proposals were not developed until the 1980s, 
when the Greek government expressed its intention 
to implement the Upper Acheloos Diversion Project, 
designed to transfer up to 0.6 km3 of water per year to 
Thessaly. 
The government’s vision is to bring together two 
of Greece’s most important natural resources - the 
Acheloos River and the Thessaly plain - for the beneﬁt 
of the national economy. 
In particular, the plan is to divert water from the Upper 
Acheloos River to the Pinios River in Thessaly, at the 
position Drakotripa on the other side of the Pindos 
mountain range, and from there to the arable land 
of Thessaly. However, there is no provision for the 
transfer of water from the outlet of the diversion to the 
non-existent irrigation network of Thessaly. 
Decisions by the Council of State (Greece’s Supreme 
Court) in the 1990s and in 2005 declared the project 
illegal, on the grounds that it violated Greek and EU 
Photo 4: Traditional wooden bridge at upper Acheloos River, Greece
© WWF / V. Psihogiou
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legislation on water management, Greek legislation on 
EIA and international legislation on the preservation of 
cultural heritage. Nevertheless, the diversion is still on 
the Greek political agenda today and support remains 
strong. In July 2006 the project was declared a plan 
of “national importance”, thus bypassing the legal 
obstacle of the Supreme Court ruling. 
Expected environmental and social impacts:
The project is expected to cause irreversible damage to 
ecosystems of exceptional ecological value and could 
bring about local extinctions of several populations 
of endangered and internationally protected species, 
including otter (Lutra lutra), trout (Salmo trutta) and 
dipper (Cinclus cinclus). 
Populations of other species such as grey wolf 
(Canis lupus), wildcat (Felis silvestris) and roe deer 
(Capreolus capreolus) are expected to be seriously 
disturbed both during and after construction by 
alterations to the landscape. The pristine forest 
ecosystems of the area will be seriously damaged 
through the opening of roads during the construction 
and operational phases of the dams. 
The riverine habitats of the Southern Pindos face 
the prospect of permanent alterations, due to the 
construction of deep reservoirs. Further downstream, 
the wetlands of the Messolongi Lagoons Complex (one 
of the 10 Ramsar wetlands in Greece), a site of global 
ornithological signiﬁcance, are expected to suffer from 
serious reduction in freshwater input. It is also worth 
noting that the ﬂow of the Acheloos River has been 
reduced by 12% between 1980 and 2006 (Skoulikidis 
2009). The Acheloos Valley and Delta have also been 
included in the national Natura 2000 list.
The construction works in fragile mountain ecosystems 
are also likely to exacerbate soil erosion and landslides 
and large tracts of land will be inundated by the main 
reservoirs. The diversion project is also expected to 
have serious socio-economic and cultural impacts. 
These include destruction of important cultural 
monuments such the 11th century monastery of St 
George of Myrophyllo, and a number of stone bridges 
which will be inundated. 
The project is also linked to the restoration of Lake 
Karla in Thessaly, which was drained in order to 
gain arable land in 1962. In 1995, it was decided to 
re-establish the lake. Most of the water (60%) to the 
Lake Karla will ﬂow from Pinios River, which, in turn, 
will receive the water from Acheloos diversion. The 
reconstitution of Lake Karla highlights the problem of 
the continuous (mis)management of water resources. 
Analysis:
Economically, the sustainability of this IBT project is 
questionable. A cost-beneﬁt analysis done in 1988, on 
behalf of the Ministry of National Economy, concluded 
that even if the construction and operational timetables 
were met, the project was only marginally in the ‘black’ 
ﬁnancially. 
The project is driven by the wish to increase 
agricultural output in Thessaly, but water supply 
problems in that region can be largely attributed to the 
mismanagement of its water resources for irrigation, 
and the widespread cultivation of cotton, a water 
intensive (‘thirsty’) crop. In fact, the economic viability 
of the project is dependent on cotton farming, which 
is at present heavily subsidised; these subsidies per 
kilogram of crop being close to the world market price. 
Cotton subsidies are being phased out under the 
framework of the reformed EU Common Agricultural 
Policy and are expected to be completely discontinued 
after 2013. However, Greece continues to support 
intensive cotton production and seems unwilling to 
plan for a smooth shift towards the cultivation of less 
“thirsty” crops. 
Photo 5: Mouth of Acheloos River in Central Greece
© WWF / D. Vasiliadis
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Thessaly is a region naturally rich in water (e.g. Pinios 
River, Lake Karla, Pamisos River). However, the 
use of inefﬁcient irrigation methods has wasted large 
quantities, leading to serious water supply problems. 
Unregulated bore drilling for irrigation has caused 
depletion and increased salinity of the groundwater, 
leading to salinization of the soil, a situation further 
exacerbated by wasteful irrigation methods. 
Rather than a large scale IBT, the construction of a 
series of small reservoirs in the rivers of Thessaly, 
coupled with efﬁcient irrigation methods, would 
guarantee better distribution of irrigation water and also 
be more cost effective.
Summary:
Where Upper Acheloos Diversion Project - Greece
When Original plan dates to 1930s
Designed in 1980s – currently on hold, but possibility of revival of plans
Receiving basin Plain of Thessaly
Donating basin Acheloos
Distance 174 km
Volume diverted 0.6 km3/yr
Structures Mesochora mega dam (150 m high) and Mesochora reservoir (228 m3 volume)
Mesochora – Glystra tunnel (7.5 km long)
Sykia mega dam (150 m high) and Sykia reservoir
Sykia diversion channel to Thessaly (17 400 m long)
Mouzaki major dam (135 m high) and Mouzaki reservoir
Pyli dam (90 m high) and Pyli reservoir
Pyli – Mouzaki tunnel (8 km)
Cost Not known. Construction cost estimated at € 720 million (US$ 971 million). However total 
cost including necessary adaptations of irrigation networks, complementary infrastructures, 
maintenance and management have never been estimated. In 1996 the total cost was 
estimated at € 2.9-4.4 billion (US$ 3.9-5.9 billion)
Purposes Provision of irrigation water for 240 000 ha of land in Thessaly
Environmental 
cost
Serious impacts on rare riverine and forest habitats and landscapes of South Pindos
Destruction of Greece’s most important habitat for the trout
Impacts on downstream freshwater habitats, including Ramsar and Natura 2000-listed areas, 
due to reduced ﬂow 
Extensive disruption of fragile mountain landscapes
Social costs Loss of cultural heritage
Disruption of Southern Pindos communities
Use of large amounts of national funding to support unsustainable agricultural practices
Alternatives? Address mismanagement of water in Thessaly region 
Apply demand management practices 
Construction of smaller reservoirs in rivers of Thessaly
Reduce production of ‘thirsty’ crops (cotton in this case), consider relocation of the water 
footprint of cotton production to other regions where the impacts are minimal
Improve irrigation efﬁciency
Take measures to counteract falls in groundwater tables and soil salinization
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Case study 5:   
São Francisco Basin Interlinking Project, 
Brazil
Why an IBT ?
The São Francisco Basin Interlinking Project is 
designed to supply water to 12 million people in the 
semi-arid region of Pernambuco Agreste and the 
metropolitan area of Fortaleza in north-east Brazil 
by collecting water from the São Francisco Basin 
between Sobradinho and Itaparica dams in the state of 
Pernambuco. 
This project involves the construction of canals, water 
pumping stations, small reservoirs and hydroelectric 
plants and is part of the Program for Sustainable 
Development of the Semi-arid and São Francisco River 
Basin. Two main axes of development are proposed, 
centred on major canals: Eixo Norte and Exio Leste. 
Costs are expected to be at least US$ 2.38 billion and 
up to 1 million jobs may be generated.
Designed in 2000, the Federal Government modiﬁed 
and released the proposal in 2004 and states that the 
project will beneﬁt 12 million people, irrigate 300 000 
hectares, contribute to one million jobs and provide 
a solution to drought. The São Francisco River Basin 
Committee, represented by eight states, agrees that 
supply is important but publicly expressed concern 
about the approach proposed. 
Although the São Francisco River Basin Committee did 
not approve the project, the National Water Resources 
Council did in February 2006. 
The National Water Agency issued a 20-year 
authorization for water use to the National Integration 
Ministry, on September 22nd in 2005, and also 
issued the Certiﬁcate of Sustainability Evaluation for 
Water Engineering for the project. Construction has 
commenced on over one hundred kilometres of canals 
on both axes, although there are more than ten court 
challenges to the project approvals before the Federal 
Supreme Court.
Expected environmental and social impacts:
According to the National Integration Ministry, 
environmental impacts will be minimal as the amount 
of water diverted is as little as 1.4% of average ﬂows, 
which is disputed by opponents who calculated that  
25-47% of such ﬂows may be diverted. 
Despite this view, the project has caused controversy, 
as opponents (including state government institutions 
of the proposed donor basins, technical councils, 
and churches) claimed the main use for the water 
would be for irrigation, neglecting other uses. Other 
criticisms cover technical and operational feasibility, 
national priorities, economics, justice and social value, 
environmental aspects and legal support, as follows: 
• A continuing focus on large, expensive water 
engineering projects which overlook impacts on 
freshwater ecosystems and the use of alternative, 
environmentally friendly and lower cost 
interventions;
• As this is a region forecast to suffer greater water 
scarcity with climate change, the medium to 
long term viability of the new infrastructure is 
questioned;
Map 5: Project for Interlinking São Francisco Basin to the North-eastern Basins 
Source: National Integration Ministry, Brazil 
WWF Germany 26
• Only 4% of the diverted water will beneﬁt the 
dispersed population, 26% will be for urban and 
industrial use and 80% for irrigation;
• Temporary loss of jobs and incomes due to land 
appropriations;
• A continuation of what is in effect subsidized 
agriculture without full consideration of the 
social, economic and environmental costs 
• Lack of investments, training and modernization 
of water management entities; 
• Risks of conﬂict during the construction works. 
Speciﬁc environmental costs will derive from 
biodiversity loss, fragmentation of native vegetation, 
risk of introduced non-native species potentially 
harmful to people, disrupted ﬁshing due to more 
dams, siltation, and water loss due to evaporation as 
the water cycle is altered. The Exio Leste canal has 
been constructed up to either side of the Serra Negra 
Biological Reserve, Brazil’s ﬁrst nature reserve. Further 
construction would bisect and damage this critical 
remnant of the Atlantic Forest, which is the territory of 
the Pipipa and Kambiowa indigenous peoples.
The Union’s Counting Court (TCU, in Portuguese) 
concluded that the beneﬁts of the IBT are overestimated 
and the costs are underestimated. The TCU pointed 
out that the project’s effectiveness depends on the 
capability of the Federal Government to manage and 
distribute water to the population on completion of 
the link. The TCU’s audit also recommended that the 
Federal Government proceed to a full evaluation of the 
project and requested a plan to show the interlinking 
processes that will integrate all the actions.
The proposed project presents a very complex situation, 
with many concerns that go beyond the physical 
construction issues. There are political rivalries 
between the State of Bahia (against the construction) 
and the State of Ceará (in favour); the perception being 
that the IBT would give the latter more inﬂuence. 
WWF Brazil has stated that all possible alternatives to 
the IBT should be taken into account before a decision 
is taken to construct such enormous hydrological 
infrastructure.
Analysis:
Critics contend that there is already adequate water in 
north east Brazil to meet the needs of the residents if 
only it were managed more efﬁciently. The possible 
alternatives were not adequately indicated by the EIR 
such as, for example:
1. Demand management, including more efﬁcient 
use of water with resultant reduction of losses 
and re-location of the water footprint to the 
regions where the impacts would be minimal (i.e. 
transfer of virtual water to meet the food demand 
rather than to import real water to grow food in 
the regions itself);
2. Greater reliance on small-scale and decentralised 
systems, such as rainwater harvesting;
3. Revision of water licences in line with water 
actually used and needed; 
4. Federal Government priority in implementing 
the São Francisco Basin and Brazilian Semi-Arid 
Integrated Sustainable Development Program, 
including:
- Rehabilitation of vulnerable and 
environmentally degraded basins with a 
view to improving sanitation services and 
water supply, recovery of riparian forest, soil 
conservation and solid waste management; 
- National Action of Desertiﬁcation Combat 
and Droughts Effects Mitigation Programme 
(PAN-Brazil) including plan to reduce 
expansion of semi-arid areas;
- Strengthening capacity building with local 
institutions;
- Federal partnerships with states and 
municipalities, as well as building 
partnerships with civil society – NGOs and 
the regional productive sectors;
- Expand regional partnerships – structuring 
actions like the one with Northeast Bank 
(Banco do Nordeste, in Portuguese); 
- Implement better Integrated River Basin 
Management;
- Provide water security for the dispersed 
population;
- Develop regional economies to allow better 
quality of life for the river dwelling people;
 Groundwater program; 
- Conclusion of unﬁnished water development 
projects. 
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Summary:
Where Brazil: Rio Sao Francisco Project
When This project started during colonial period. 
It was taken up again by President Lula de Silva in 2000.
Receiving basin A number of smaller catchments in the states of Ceara, Rio Grande do Norte, Pernambuco 
and Paraíba.
Donating basin San Francisco, from the states of Minas Gerais, Goiás, Distrito Federal, Bahia, Sergipe, 
Alagoas.
Distance The river is 2 700km long. The two canals total 720km.
Structures Public supply and multiple uses, mainly for irrigation. Northern axis: 4 pumping stations, 
22 canals, 6 tunnels, 26 small reservoirs, 2 hydroelectric plants of 40 megawatt and 12 
megawatt capacity; Eastern axis: 5 pumping stations; 2 tunnels and 9 reservoirs.
Cost US$ 2.38 billion.
Purposes Irrigation of about 330 000 ha.
Bring 2 092 km of dry riverbeds back to life.
Discharge of 26-127 m3/s. Average is 53 m3/sec.
Environmental 
cost
Reduction in biodiversity of native aquatic communities in receiving basins.
Loss and fragmentation of areas with native vegetation.
Uncertainty about the adequacy of stream regimen determined.
Social costs Reducing the hydroelectric capacity in the donating basin.
Only large landowners and big businesses will beneﬁt from the 3.9% increase in water 
availability in the receiving states.
Alternatives? Demand management.
Re-location of part of its water footprint to other more resilient regions by virtual water 
transfers rather than real water.
Revision of water licences.
Small scale and decentralized infrastructure based on technologies such as rainwater 
harvesting and sustainable groundwater use.
Implementation of the São Francisco Basin and Brazilian Semi-Arid Integrated Sustainable 
Development Program.
Rehabilitation and revitalization of the São Francisco River Basin. 
Strengthen negotiations with river basin committees (RBC) – as in case of RBC for the 
Prircicaba, Capivari and Jundiai Rivers, establishing new rules that reduce volume of water 
to be transferred in the dry season.
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Case study 6:   
Olmos Transfer Project, Peru
Why an IBT ?
The prospect of deriving water from the Huancabamba 
River in the Amazon basin to irrigate the pampas of 
Olmos was ﬁrst proposed in 1924. The pampas of 
Olmos lie on the coastal strip of northern Peru and 
are extensive, ﬂat, sparsely populated areas with very 
little rainfall. The vegetation varies from desert to dry 
forests.
After numerous delays, a private-public partnership 
was signed between the regional government of 
Lambayeque and ProInversion for the Olmos Tinajones 
Special Project (or PEOT), and in late 2005 drilling 
commenced on the 19.3 km long tunnel through the 
Andes mountains to irrigate 150 000 ha of land. In 
mid 2009, the 44 million m3 Limon Reservoir was 
practically ﬁnished and most of the trans-Andean 
tunnel had been drilled. The project’s ﬁrst phase is 
scheduled to conclude in 2010. 
The second phase comprises the diversion of waters 
from the Manchara and Tabaconas rivers to the 
Huancabamba. The Manchara River originates in the 
rural community of San Miguel de Tabaconas, while 
the Tabaconas River originates in the Tabaconas 
Namballe National Sanctuary; a protected area 
established in 1980 for the conservation of the paramo 
ecosystem, cloud forest and endangered species like 
spectacle bear (Tremarctos ornatus) and montane tapir 
(Tapirus pinchaque). The third phase consists of an 
irrigation system which will irrigate 150 000 ha of land. 
Two hydroelectric power stations are also part of the 
project with a planned output of 4 000 GWh.
Map 6: Olmos Project Plan, 
ﬁrst phase  
Source: Odebrecht, 2006
Expected environmental and social impacts:
The estimated cost of this IBT is US$ 185 million, 
however no estimates of the potential beneﬁts are 
known. 
The environmental and social damage however is 
likely to be substantial. The Environmental Impact 
Assessment only addresses the ﬁrst phase and as such 
does not address impacts of the second and third phase 
in the Manchara, Tabaconas and Olmos regions. 
During the dry months (July-September) there is 
usually very little supply ﬂow available. At this time 
no IBT water should be taken. A resolution was passed 
in May 2006 to maintain discharge at 1.7 km3/yr. It is 
debatable whether this is a sufﬁcient environmental 
ﬂow. 
According to Zegarra et al (2006), no measures have 
been taken so far to avoid the inevitable logging of the 
valuable dry forest. No less than 66 000 ha of these 
forests are going to be converted into irrigated ﬁelds. 
A critical aspect of the Olmos Transfer Project is the 
status of the lands that will be converted to irrigation. 
To make the project attractive for private investors 
the government claimed a certain area of land. This 
was done in the 1990s. The state reserved 110 000 
ha; 80 000 ha of the Santo Domingo de Olmos 
community and 30 000 ha of the Mórrope community. 
The expropriation of these areas from the community 
of Santo Domingo de Olmos was done without 
consultation, and has been disputed by the community 
(Zegarra et al 2006).
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A key question is who are the buyers of the new lands 
suitable for irrigation? People from outside the region, 
who have sufﬁcient resources to buy the land and the 
water? What will they produce? High quality products 
for export to the capital Lima or abroad? If so, this 
is likely to create social conﬂicts between locals and 
the new inhabitants. This is a very real risk, as nearly 
50 percent of the 218 social conﬂicts recorded by the 
national ombudsman’s ofﬁce as of February 2009 were 
triggered by socio-environmental problems, many of 
them related to water management issues (Rosales 
2009).
The future of the local carob tree forest is also 
crucial. This forest type is valuable for the local 
people and their way of living. They use it as food 
for their livestock, for apiculture, to produce carob 
and ultimately they use the wood to make charcoal 
(Zegarra et al 2006).
An additional social impact of this proposal will be 
the forced re-location of the village of Pedregal, with 
its 200 inhabitants, in the Huancabamba River basin. 
While compensation has been given for this relocation, 
no information is available on how this has affected the 
ways of life of these people.
Photo 6: Start Trans Andes Tunnel © Credit: WWF / W.Nagel
Photo 7:Rice paddies near the river Huancabamba  
© Credit: WWF / W.Nagel
Analysis:
While this ﬁrst phase of the project is nearly 
complete, the second and third phases in their 
early stages, meaning that there may still be time 
to apply adjustments and avoid environmental and 
social impacts. The development of an independent, 
integrated and comprehensive environmental impact 
assessment (EIA) study should be a priority. This 
assessment should consider the likely impacts 
of climate change and response options. In the 
headwaters, poor landholders could beneﬁt from a 
payment for watershed services scheme to manage the 
river basins well to sustain PEOT’s sources of water. To 
solve the social conﬂict relating to communal lands and 
the absence of land titles, a social impact assessment 
should also be done. 
If there is to be conversion of some lands to irrigated 
ﬁelds, as per the proposal, then this should avoid 
areas with valuable dry forest. In this way the local 
community members will retain their forests and so 
at least a part of their communal grounds will be safe 
(Zegarra et al 2006).
Given the climate and landscape, a preferable 
alternative to total reliance on irrigated cropping may 
be to blend this with cattle breeding. By promoting 
irrigated agriculture through the IBT it is potentially 
making the agricultural sector very vulnerable. 
Irrigation is also likely to see trees removed, high rates 
of evaporative water loss, and possibly salinization 
problems. PEOT directors have expressed an intention 
to reforest some areas of dry forests to compensate for 
the areas that will be lost.
The implication of climate change on the viability 
of the scheme is unknown, but the loss of more than 
20% of the area covered by glaciers in Peru is certain 
to change the hydrology of rivers (Rosales 2009) 
and operations of water infrastructure schemes. The 
National Center for Atmospheric Research will conduct 
a study on the impact of climate change on the PEOT 
with Inter-American Development Bank funds.
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Summary:
Where Peru: Olmos Transfer Project (PEOT)
When July 2004 contract was signed.
Receiving basin Olmos
Donating basin Huancabamba
Distance 19.3 km long tunnel.
Structures 2 tunnels , 1 dam of 43 m (phase 1), 2 hydropower plants and 1 dam (phase 2), irrigation 
system (phase 3).
Cost US$ 185 million (phase 1)
Purposes Irrigation
Energy supply
Environmental 
cost
Logging of dry forest in favour of new irrigation grounds.
Deterioration of ecosystems in the donating basin.
Changed river ﬂows.
Social costs Loss of communal grounds and no recognition of the communal land rights of the farmers.
Relocation of 200 people in donating basin.
Alternatives? Apply demand management instruments to reduce water demands.
Introducing water saving methods.
Change from ‚thirsty‘ export products to rain-fed crops.
Save the carob dry forest by avoiding conversion of these lands to irrigation.
Blending irrigated cropping with stock breeding.
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Case study 7:   
The South-North Transfer, PR of China
Why an IBT ?
The ongoing water shortage in north China – especially 
in the agricultural and industrial areas of the densely 
populated north China plain – is by any measure, very 
severe. Always fairly arid, the region’s water resources 
have been heavily drained by intensive agriculture, 
rapid population growth, and an expanding industrial 
sector. 
As incomes rise, China’s per person water demand 
for residential use is also increasing. Northern China 
is characterized with inefﬁcient irrigation water use, 
declining water quality and rapidly growing non-
agricultural water demands. The region is experiencing 
growing pressure to divert water from the agricultural 
sector to the municipal and industrial sectors.
With only 10% of China‘s water resouces, North China 
has about 40% of China‘s cultivated area and produces 
31% of its gross indusctrial outputs. On the top of 
that the spatial distribution of China’s water resources 
is quite uneven. The result is falling water tables, 
pollution and dry rivers in the North China Plain. 
Since the late 1970s, the annual water withdrawals 
in the North China Plain have exceeded the limits of 
the annual renewable supplies. The over extraction 
of groundwater has caused depletion of rivers and 
aquifers at an alarming rate (Shi 1997) and as a result 
ecosystems and the environment have been severely 
degraded.
In every year of the 1990s, the Yellow River, China‘s 
second largest river, experienced periods when there 
was no run-off to the sea. The worst case happened in 
1997, when there was no runoff to the sea for 226 days. 
When there is no surface water available, the demands 
are met by over-drafting the groundwater, and in the 
North China Plain this exceeds 90 km3 in a year (Yang 
and Zehnder 2005).
While China’s government cannot be criticised for 
providing its citizens with water in deﬁcit areas, critics 
believe alternatives to the South-North Transfer Project, 
with better socio-economic outcomes and lower 
environmental impacts, were not adequately considered 
before the project was approved (Sharma 2005). 
The studies on the South-to-North Water Transfers 
started in the 1950s and resulted in three water transfer 
projects; the Western Route Project (WRP), the Middle 
Route Project (MRP) and the Eastern Route Project 
(ERP) being proposed. 
The project will take water from the Yangtze basin and 
transfer it more than 1 000 kilometres to the Yellow 
River, Huai River and Hai River basins in the north 
(Government China, www.nsbd.gov.cn). China‘s 
Ministry of Environmental Protection (formerly State 
Environment Protection Administration - SEPA) has 
completed EIAs of the Eastern and Middle Routes of 
the SNWT Project, and has approved the projects for 
construction. The Western Route is currently being 
assessed.
Expected environmental and social impacts:
Eastern Route Project
The main challenge associated with the Eastern 
Route Project is environmental cleanup, rather than to 
address negative impact. Agricultural run-off, sewage, 
factory waste, river transport pollution, and intensive 
aquaculture already heavily pollute the existing 
waterways along the route. Pulp and paper factories 
are the biggest point source polluters, but agricultural 
Map 7: Sketch Map of The Scheme of Eastern Route Project.
Source: http://www.nsbd.gov.cn/zx/english/erp.htm
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run-off is also quite severe. The water quality meets 
only the minimum requirement for drinking at the 
point of diversion. That too deteriorates rapidly as 
we move further north as a result of the inﬂux of the 
untreated wastewater from agricultural run-off, sewage, 
factory waste, river transport pollution, and intensive 
aquaculture along the route.
The Eastern Route Project will mainly refurbish, 
expand and upgrade the already existing infrastructure, 
including the old Grand Canal thus improving the 
environmental conditions on already deteriorated route. 
For these reasons the Eastern Route Project may have 
some substantial environmental beneﬁts.
Middle Route Project
The main concern with the Middle Route Project 
is twofold. First is the major social problem as it 
displaces nearly 330 000 people due to the need to raise 
the Danjiangkou Dam on the Han River, a tributary 
of the Yangtze. Second is related to the impacts on 
environment and ecosystem due to the reduced ﬂow 
along the middle and lower reaches of the Han River, 
between the Route intake and Wuhan (where the Han 
River ﬂows into the Yangtze). The average annual 
surface runoff of the Han River is only around 39 km3/
Map 8: Sketch Map of The Scheme of the Middle Route Project.
Source: http://www.nsbd.gov.cn/zx/english/mrp.htm
yr and that drops considerably during dry years up to  
19 km3/yr. Thus, a diversion of nearly half of the annual 
ﬂow during dry years would have a major impact on 
aquatic ecosystem and the environment downstream of 
the diversion point.
According to experts the short-term strategy for dealing 
with the drain on the Han River is to seasonally adjust 
the volume of water diverted. The long-term solution 
being discussed is to extend the diversion to the Three 
Gorges Reservoir farther south.
Western Route Project
For the Western Route Project, work is scheduled to 
begin in 2010 to 2015. The Western Route Project is 
planned to divert water from three tributaries of the 
Yangtze River to the Yellow River. It passes through 
remote regions where economic development is 
relatively very small compared to the burgeoning 
developments in the east. 
Here, the upper stretches of the Yangtze and the Yellow 
River will be linked through more than 300 km of 
tunnels built in remote and mountainous terrain with an 
altitude of 4 000 metres. As the main part of the route is 
located around 4 000 metres above sea level, and with 
geological difﬁculties at the construction route, the cost 
is bound to be signiﬁcantly higher.
Three dams are needed in the Yalong River (175 m), 
Tongtian River (302 m) and the Dadu River (296 m). 
There will be geological difﬁculties with regional 
earthquake levels of about 6-7 even 8-9 locally. 
Because the elevation of the bed of the Yellow River 
is higher than that of the corresponding section of the 
Yangtze (by 80-450 meters), pumping stations will be 
necessary to move the water into the Yellow River. This 
infrastructural work is estimated to cost US$  
37.5 billion for a supply of about 20 km3/yr. The total 
water needed for the whole of north China is 52 km3/yr.
While the Eastern and Middle Routes are aimed 
directly at supporting China’s burgeoning and 
prospering eastern cities, the Western Route would 
direct very expensive resources to further subsidizing 
with cheap water the grain farmers of China’s middle 
west. Farmers in that region already draw large 
volumes of low-cost water from the Yellow River 
in Gansu, Ningxia, Inner Mongolia and Shaanxi, in 
producing low-value crops.
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Pressure to promote economic development in China’s 
poorer western provinces appears to be compelling 
middle planners to promise the construction of the 
Western Route Project.
Cumulatively, the three water diversions may impact 
on the environment and livelihoods of people living 
downstream along the Yangtze. Some forecast 
problems include declines in ﬁsheries, coastal erosion, 
and ingress of seawater further up the Yangtze channel 
that may jeopardize Shanghai’s water supply (Biswas 
et al. 1983; Ghassemi and White 2007). Consequently, 
Shanghai Municipal Government is investing 17 billion 
CNY  ~ 2.5 billion US$ to build a drinking water 
storage reservoir on the Qingcao Island.
Analysis:
China needs a change of water management philosophy 
and this is already happening through improved water 
laws and policies adopted in recent years. 
The South-North Water Transfer scheme is expensive 
and with fewer beneﬁts compared to the alternatives. 
At an estimated cost of over US$ 59.9 billion it is not 
only costly to taxpayers, but also to the environment, 
especially for the Western and the Middle Routes. 
There are alternatives at hand for saving water without 
damaging the environment, such as:
• Re-locating the water footprints of the North to 
appropriate regions in the South.  
• Increasing system efﬁciency such as by 
enhancing distribution efﬁciency by reducing 
transmission losses.
• Improving water use efﬁciency, particularly 
in agriculture, by reducing subsidies for 
agricultural water use.;
• Increasing water reuse, including better 
pollution prevention and control and large-scale 
investment in water treatment facilities; and
• Recharging groundwater reserves and help 
in conserving water that can be later used in 
drought conditions.
Summary:
Where China: Eastern route (Lower reaches of Yangtze river)
When Started in December 2002, building on some existing projects. Planned completion in 2016.
Receiving basin Yellow River Basin, Hai River Basin
Donating basin Lower reaches of Yangtze
Distance 1 156 km (main route), discharge of 14.8 km3/yr
Structures Canal, tunnel, pumping stations
Cost US$ 8.2 billion
Purposes Irrigation
Municipal and industrial water supply
Ecological water for over-exploited northern rivers
Environmental 
cost
Sediment loss affecting riparian and coastal maintenance.
Less dilution of pollutants.
Invasive biota and chemicals in the passing lakes (Hongze, Luoma, Nansi, Dongping).
Change of river patterns and in natural ﬂow cycles of the rivers, disturbing the wildlife and 
ecosystems.
Social costs About 72 000 people displaced.
Alternatives? Improving water distribution efﬁciency.
Re-location of the water footprints by virtual water transfers.
Improving water distribution efﬁciency.
Increase of water use efﬁciency and reduction of subsidies for agriculture water use.
Recharging groundwater reserves and conserving water that can be later used in drought 
conditions.
Where China: Middle route (middle reaches of Yangtze river)
When Started in 2003. Completion is due by 2012
Receiving basin Yellow River Basin, Hai River Basin: Beijing and Tianjin Municipalities and Hebei, Henan 
and Hubei provinces
Donating basin Middle reaches of Yangtze (from Danjiangkou Reservoir of the Han River, a tributary of the 
Yangtze)
Distance 1 427 km (main route)
Structures Canal, aqueduct, tunnel
Cost US$ 14.7 billion
Purposes Municipal and industrial water supply
Irrigation
Environmental 
cost
Reducing water ﬂow of donating basins
Social costs Relocation of 330 000 inhabitants due to increase in size of Danjiangkou Reservoir and 
along the route itself.
Alternatives? Improving water distribution efﬁciency.
Re-location of the water footprints by virtual water transfers.
Improving water distribution efﬁciency.
Increase of water use efﬁciency and reduction of subsidies for agriculture water use.
Recharging groundwater reserves and conserving water that can be later used in drought 
conditions.
Where China: Western route (upper reaches of Yangtze river)
When Still doing preliminary studies because of complex area 
Receiving basin Yellow River; Qinghai, Gansu, Shaanxi, Shanxi Provinces, the Ningxia Hui Autonomous 
Region and Inner Mongolia.
Donating basin Tongtian River - the Upper reaches of Yangtze; Yalong and Dadu Rivers - the  tributaries of 
the Yangtze.
Distance 450 km of tunnels, 20 km3/yr may be the discharge.
Structures Dams, tunnels, pumping stations.
Cost 37 billion US$ (only preliminary costs).
Purposes Municipal and industrial water supply
Irrigation
Ecological water for northern rivers
Environmental 
cost
Vulnerable and fragile area
Part of Tibetan mountainous ecoregion
Water availability is not inexhaustible, especially in light of climate change with glaciers 
receding
Real danger of earthquakes and landslides during construction
Social costs Relocation of people, including minorities.
Alternatives? Improving water distribution efﬁciency.
Re-location of the water footprints by virtual water transfers.
Improving water distribution efﬁciency.
Increase of water use efﬁciency and reduction of subsidies for agriculture water use.
Recharging groundwater reserves and conserving water that can be later used in drought 
conditions.
Conclusions - summary of lessons learnt
As was the case with the long established IBTs 
considered in Section 3, there are many common 
themes running through the four case studies of 
prospective transfer schemes reviewed here. The 
table below lists 11 so-named ‘Process weaknesses or 
expected negative impacts from the IBT’ these are also 
common to those identiﬁed as real negative impacts in 
Section 3 relating to the long-established IBTs. 
In the following section, a step-wise approach to 
avoid these oft-repeated errors is presented and then 
illustrated with examples and tools that can be used to 
defer, delay or even totally avoid the need for an IBT.
It seems that despite the well-documented 
problems associated with the earliest IBTs, the 
lessons have not yet been learned and that 
decision makers continue to repeat the same 
errors when contemplating and then moving 
forward to initiate new schemes. 
Needless to say, these interbasin transfer schemes that 
have been planned for decades have not incorporated 
emerging issues that are critical in justifying this 
investment, such as the alternative offered by trade in 
virtual water, nor threats to this inﬂexible infrastructure 
from the impacts of climate change.
Process weaknesses or expected negative 
impacts of IBT
Case study
4. Acheloos 
Diversion, 
Greece
5. São Francisco 
Basin Interlinking 
Project, Brazil
6. Olmos 
Transfer 
Project, Peru
7. South-North 
Transfer, PR of 
China
Demand management in recipient basin 
not serious part of pre-planning for IBT, 
potentially supporting on-going water 
wastage
● ● ● ●
IBT expected to become driver for 
unsustainable water use in recipient basin– 
irrigation and urban
● ● ● ●
Will create strong dependence on IBT in 
recipient community
● ● ● ●
Donor basin likely to experience serious 
environmental impacts through reduced ﬂows 
especially
● - ● ●
IBT expected to create or escalate threats 
to critically endangered, threatened species, 
Ramsar sites, Natura 2000 sites etc
● - ● -
Scheme likely to see economic beneﬁts in the 
recipient basin at the cost of communities in 
the donor basin
● ● ● ●
Inadequate consultations with those likely to 
be affected either directly or indirectly
● ● ● ●
IBT may become catalyst for social conﬂict 
between donor and recipient basins or with 
government
● ● ● ●
IBT is not expected to help the situation of 
the poor affected or displaced by it - ● ● ●
Post IBT mitigation costs expected to be very 
high, either environmentally or socially
● ● ● ●
Governance arrangements for IBT appear 
weak - ● ● -
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5  Climate change
Supply side responses
Climate change will be felt ﬁrst by most people in 
changes in water availability. Traditionally the water 
sector has assumed that water ﬂows, while varying 
within a certain range from season to season and year to 
year, were predictable and thus ‘stable’. These average 
ﬂows are the basis for water infrastructure designs and 
investments. However the changes in precipitation and 
evapotranspiration are changing river inﬂows. Many 
regions, where a lot of people live, are expected to 
become drier, while other areas may become wetter. 
More frequent extreme events are expected: storms, 
ﬂoods and droughts. Melting glaciers may deprive 
many rivers of consistent seasonal ﬂows. As a result 
more erratic and diminished water ﬂows are anticipated 
in many rivers prompting proponents of supply side 
solutions call for accelerated investments in interbasin 
water transfer schemes and more water storage. 
Unsurprisingly, industry proponents like the 
International Commission on Large Dams stridently 
propose more infrastructure investment: „An adequate 
and safe water supply is an essential component to our 
health, environment, communities and economy. But 
two major factors will increase the stakes: the incoming 
climate change, making the water resources more 
irregular, with drying trends necessitating more water 
storage; and the world population growth, increasing 
the demand for domestic, agricultural and industrial 
water with emphasis on irrigation for food production. 
Therefore, the crucial role dams played throughout 
human history will continue during the 21st century” 
(ICOLD 2007:5). Some academic assessments more 
cautiously support such measures, such as (Kabat and 
Schaik 2003:75) to say “Increased storage is a logical 
option to cope with changing hydrological parameters.” 
The WWDR comments (WWAP 2009:81): “Today, 
in parts of many countries demand exceeds available 
runoff. These countries depend on dams and water 
harvesting systems to control irregular storm runoff. 
The situation is particularly acute in arid and semi-
arid areas [...]. Increasingly, it will be impossible 
to do without some form of water storage, either 
surface (reservoirs or water-harvesting systems) or 
underground (cisterns and aquifers). Global changes, 
in particular the impacts of climate change, elevate 
the need for water storage to a higher priority”. 
They qualify this by saying “Investments in physical 
infrastructure must be accompanied by investments 
in ‘soft’ infrastructure [...] However, while there is a 
strong relation between water investment and growth, 
the relation between the quantity of water used and 
a country’s level of development is inconclusive [...] 
Many water-poor economies have developed, while 
the ratio of water use to GDP in many developed 
countries has been declining” (WWAP 2009:83). Many 
of these proponents are vague on the extent to which 
they propose to rely on less-contentious water storage 
via natural wetlands, rainwater harvesting and better 
groundwater management, versus more dams and 
IBTs. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC) is even more cautious is stating “With increased 
temporal runoff variability due to climate change, 
increased water storage behind dams may be beneﬁcial, 
especially where annual runoff does not decrease 
signiﬁcantly” (Bates et al. 2008:12).
A number of governments are now using climate 
change to justify more water infrastructure. The “Water 
guide” prepared for the 2009 5th World Water Forum’s 
ministerial declaration, while making reference to 
“non-structural adaptation measures,” claims that: 
“National and sub-national strategies need to be 
developed for adaptation to climate change/variability 
[...] Assessments of needed infrastructure for adaptation 
should be carried out and then required infrastructure 
planned and ﬁnanced. [...] Hydropower development 
and inland navigation needs to be revisited and 
developed as an adaptation measure.“ It goes onto 
call on decision makers to “Invest in sustainable and 
socially responsible hydropower and water storage [...] 
as hydropower is an effective adaptation measure in 
the context of climate change” and “Enhance inland 
waterborne transport.“ (MFAT and WWC 2009:4-5).
Individual governments have included interbasin water 
transfer schemes in their climate change policies. For 
instance, China’s national plan in relation to water and 
adaptation lists a number of ecosystem bases actions but 
goes onto promise: “Strengthen infrastructure planning 
and construction. Speed up building of the Project of 
South-to-North Water Diversion [case study above], 
and gradually generate the new pattern of optimized 
water resources allocation by three water diversion lines 
linking the Yangtze River, Yellow River, Huaihe River, 
and Haihe River, characterized by “four horizontal 
and three vertical lines”. Enhance the construction and 
improvement of key water control projects (reservoirs, 
etc) and infrastructures in irrigation areas. Continue 
the construction of regional water storage and water 
diversion projects” (NDRC 2007:50-51). Similarly the 
Indian Government’s plan commits to “augment storage 
capacity” (PMCCC 2008:31).
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Water grids
A number of jurisdictions have proposed “water grids” 
as a solution, namely networks of interbasin water 
infrastructure that may enable water to be moved in 
any direction to where it is required. The ideological 
underpinnings of this approach can be grasped in the 
words of Reynolds, an early proponent, who purported 
to assess „Phases in the history of the development 
and use of water resources” to deﬁne water grids as 
“A possible ultimate pattern of such development“ 
(Reynolds 1979:147). As drought, or the ﬁrst step 
changes in climate began to threaten the water supplies 
of a number of eastern Australian cities this decade, 
their state governments responded in hastily prepared 
plans to invest heavily in establishing such water grids. 
The Queensland Government is spending AUD $ 9 
billion (~ US$ 7.4 billion) on a South East Queensland 
Water Grid that they describe as the “largest urban 
drought response in Australia”. The project involves 
more than 450 kilometres of pipeline, two new dams, a 
desalination plant and three advanced water treatment 
plants to deliver around 350 million m³of additional 
water a year (QWC 2008). The plans have many 
sensible elements, like a greater reliance on recycled 
water, but also include questionable elements, such as 
a proposed interbasin transfer from a new and shallow 
dam at Traveston Crossing on the ecologically sensitive 
Mary River. 
Two of ﬁve key strategies in the Victorian 
Government’s plan (DSE 2007) involve creating 
a water grid in that state, with six links under 
construction and investigation into the feasibility of 
a seventh project. These links include some sensible 
elements, such as replacing thousands of kilometres 
of leaky open channels with a more water efﬁcient 
pipeline system in the Wimmera-Mallee region. Other 
transfers make little sense, such as the Sugarloaf 
Interconnector that would take water to Melbourne 
from the Goulburn River a major tributary of the 
water-stressed River Murray. Prepared with little 
apparent assessment of the likely climate change 
impacts, in theory government investment in greater 
water efﬁciency (to save an estimate 225 million m³ 
in the ﬁrst stage) in a major irrigation district will 
allow a third of the saved water to be allocated to 
environmental ﬂows, a third to expanding irrigation, 
and a third for export to the city. However a subsequent 
climate change assessment suggested that the Goulburn 
River is among the most over-allocated catchments 
and among the tributaries likely to be most heavily 
impacted by reduced inﬂows resulting from climate 
change (-14% in the 2030 median forecast; CSIRO 
2008:33-35). Even worse, eight years of the current 
drought (or climate change) in south eastern Australia 
has reduced River Murray inﬂows by 70% compared 
to long term average levels, much lower than those 
estimated for 2030 (MDBA 2009). Thus even if the 
water efﬁciency saving are achieved in the irrigation 
district, it is highly unlikely that there will be any water 
to transfer to Melbourne in dry times when it is needed.
What is apparent is that these Australian states are also 
responding to water scarcity with demand management 
measures and by diversifying their water sources, and 
there is considerable scope to expand these options. 
New government proposals to secure water in south 
east Queensland include reducing per capita water 
consumption by 24% over the next 50 years, and 
sourcing 30% of supplies from recycled water and 
desalination (QWC 2008). For instance Melbourne has 
reduced its water use by 22%, use of recycled water has 
increased from 2 to 14% from 1999 to 2007, and the 
government plans to produce 100 million m³ of high-
quality recycled water by 2012 (DSE 2007).
Risks from supply side responses and alternatives
In contrast to the proponents of more large-scale 
water infrastructure, a growing number of assessments 
have focussed instead on the risks in making large 
investments in inﬂexible infrastructure when climate 
change means that hydrology is no longer stationary. 
Instead they consider the need for “no and low regrets” 
water management measures to adapt to climate change 
that can be scaled up quickly as required.
Frederick (1997:141) was early in recognising the 
inherent risks in relying on supply-side solutions, 
declaring “Although new infrastructure may be an 
appropriate response to climate-induced shifts in 
hydrologic regimes and water demands, it is difﬁcult 
to plan for and justify expensive new projects when 
the magnitude, timing, and even the direction of 
the changes are unknown.” Instead, to adapt water 
management to climate change Frederick promotes: 
integrated river basin management; demand 
management; greater reliance on markets and prices to 
allocate supplies and introduce incentives to conserve; 
and better planning.
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The IPCC also considers the issue, stating that: “The 
consequences of climate change may alter the reliability 
of current water management systems and water-related 
infrastructure”. It goes onto conclude: “Adaptation 
options designed to ensure water supply during average 
and drought conditions require integrated demand-
side as well as supply-side strategies. The former 
improve water-use efﬁciency, e.g. by recycling water. 
Expanded use of economic incentives, including 
metering and pricing to encourage water conservation 
and development of water markets and implementation 
of virtual water trade, holds considerable promise for 
water savings and reallocation of water to highly valued 
uses. Supply-side strategies generally involve increases 
in storage capacity, abstraction from water courses, and 
water transfers. Integrated water resources management 
provides an important framework to achieve adaptation 
measures across socio-economic, environmental and 
administrative systems. To be effective, integrated 
approaches must occur at the appropriate scale or 
scales needed to facilitate effective actions for speciﬁc 
outcomes” (Bates et al. 2008:5-6).
The Dialogue on Water and Climate through a series 
of thematic and geographic case studies and global 
discussion examined how water managers cope with 
today’s climate variability and future climate change. 
In addition to building capacity they identiﬁed an 
extensive array of adaptation options that were 
categorised as: policy instruments; technological and 
structural instruments; risk sharing and spreading 
(insurance and ﬁnance); and change of use, activity 
or location (Kabat and Schaik 2003:61). Interbasin 
transfers were not explicitly proposed as an option but 
use of surface and ground water storage were identiﬁed 
as possible coping measures.
Moench and Stapleton (2007) assessed priorities for 
action in climate risk management based largely on 
their work in developing countries. In emphasizing the 
complementary nature of investment in infrastructure 
and “living with water”, they conclude that climate-
water risk management decisions need to be speciﬁc 
to locations and context, and that training a new 
generation of specialists to apply the concepts and tools 
is required. They identify four techniques that need to 
be developed for better climate water risk reduction, 
namely: spatial planning to reduce vulnerability; 
ﬁnancial mechanisms, particularly insurance; economic 
diversiﬁcation, including the use of virtual water and 
strategy shifting; and living with water (Moench and 
Stapleton 2007:71-73).
Hallegatte (2009) reviewed strategies to adapt water 
management to climate change, emphasizing that 
“new infrastructure will have to be able to cope with a 
large range of changing climatic conditions”, and that 
uncertainty on climate impacts makes it impractical 
to use climate forecasts for infrastructure design, 
adding that “there are good reasons to think that the 
needed climate information will not be available soon.” 
Instead, Hallegatte (2009:240) recommends more 
robust, risk management approaches, namely:
i) Selecting “no-regrets” strategies that yield 
beneﬁts even in the absence of climate change;
ii) Favouring reversible and ﬂexible options;
iii) Buying “safety margins” in new investments;
iv) Promoting soft adaption strategies; and
v) Reducing decision time horizons.
These more considered assessments on how to sustain 
water supplies and freshwater ecosystems in the face 
of climate change highlight the risks that more surface 
water storage and transfer infrastructure could prove: 
redundant as hydrology changes; more costly than 
a range of alternatives that are available; and prop 
up unsustainable practices rather than facilitating 
change to more robust livelihoods. These assessments 
emphasise the large role of non-infrastructural 
interventions, such as insurance, and of robust 
measures like conjunctive groundwater use as more 
ﬂexible adaptation to climate change.
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6  Alternatives to Interbasin Water Transfers
The preceding sections have focussed on established 
or proposed interbasin water transfers and strongly 
illustrate the case that in most instances these water 
infrastructure proposals come with a range of generally 
unacceptable or unnecessary social, economic and 
environmental costs. 
To reiterate, established IBTs are typically characterised 
by the following negative attributes:
• Demand management in the recipient basin 
was not a serious part of pre-planning for IBT, 
leading to on-going water wastage there;
• The IBT became a driver for unsustainable 
irrigation or urban water use in the recipient 
basin;
• The scheme created strong dependence on the 
IBT in the recipient community, thus promoting 
unsustainable activities, and removing the 
need to improve water use efﬁciencies or ﬁnd 
alternative water sources/supplies;
• The IBT is now seen as inadequate and other 
water supplementation approaches have 
been required such groundwater extraction, 
desalinisation, recycling etc;
• The donor basin experiences serious 
environmental impacts through reduced ﬂows 
especially;
• The IBT created or escalated threats to critically 
endangered, threatened species, Ramsar listed 
wetlands, protected areas sites etc;
• The transfer scheme saw economic beneﬁts in 
recipient basin at the cost of communities in the 
donor basin;
• The IBT served as a catalyst for social conﬂict 
between the donor and recipient basins or with 
government;
• The IBT has not helped the situation of the poor 
affected or displaced by it;
• Post IBT mitigation costs have proven very 
high, either environmentally or socially; 
• Governance arrangements for some IBT’s 
are weak, resulting in budget blow-outs or 
corruption (in some cases): and,
• Climate change impacts have generally not 
been considered in planning these IBTs 
increasing the risk that these large, inﬂexible 
investments may become largely redundant.
In section 3 it was noted that the lessons we can learn 
from existing IBTs are as follows:
1. Before progressing to commission an IBT, 
there should be a comprehensive assessment 
of the alternatives available for providing the 
water needed in the proposed recipient basin. 
Can this water be provided through demand 
management, water recycling, water harvesting, 
virtual water trades etc, before considering a 
major infrastructure investment with its possible 
environmental and social impacts? Or is there 
an alternative to meet this demand by importing 
water intensive products from water rich 
regions, thus promoting virtual water transfer 
rather than to rely on real water transfers?
2. Undertake a cost-beneﬁt analysis of the 
likely impacts of the IBT on both the donor 
and recipient basins, considering the full 
range of environmental, social and economic 
implications.
3. Ensure risks associated with the proposed IBT; 
environmental (including climatic), social and 
economic are clearly understood, and if the 
project proceeds, governance arrangements are 
adequate to manage and minimise these risks.
4. Undertake consultations with the likely 
directly and indirectly affected people, before 
a decision is taken regarding the possible 
IBT (and certainly before it becomes fait 
accompli) ensuring they understand and have 
the opportunity to voice views on likely cost, 
beneﬁts and risks.
Addressing the key weaknesses in IBT planning 
What stands out among the IBT case studies 
documented in this report, and elsewhere, are the 
following:
1. Apart from hydropower generation, a 
common driver of IBTs is a desire to promote 
agricultural production in water poor areas, and, 
in particular irrigated agriculture. This can see 
unsustainable cropping practices promoted by 
the IBT when perhaps this was unwise;
2. There is typically a failure to examine 
alternatives to the IBT that may mean delaying, 
deferring or avoiding the costs of an IBT; and
3. There are a range of governance failures 
ranging from poor to non-existent consultation 
with affected people, to failing to give sufﬁcient 
consideration or weight to the environmental, 
social and cultural impacts of the IBT, in both 
the donor and recipient basins. 
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In the following section each of these is examined more 
closely.
6.1  IBTs promoting agricultural production 
in water poor areas
Globally agriculture consumes around 70% of the water 
diverted for human use, and most of this water does not 
reach the plants it was intended to sustain. A massive 
growth in demand for agricultural expansion, driven by 
growing wealth in many countries, poverty reduction 
programs and increasingly the growth of crops for 
biofuels, threatens to consume even more water. 
International Water Management Institute & Stockholm 
International Water Institutes forecast that eradicating 
malnutrition by 2025, with current productivity, 
requires additional diversions “close to all the water 
withdrawals at present” (IWMI & SIWI 2004). As key 
rivers, ranging from the Rio Grande/Bravo, to the Nile 
and the Indus, increasingly fail to reach the sea, this 
poor water management is a source of tension between 
countries.
With many IBTs being driven by agricultural water 
demands, it is important to assess the economic 
viability of agricultural practices in the proposed 
recipient basin. As several of the case studies 
documented here reveal, the creation of an IBT can 
(or will) stimulate expansion of agricultural activities, 
especially irrigation, in areas that may not be suited 
to this climatically or otherwise. It can also foster the 
establishment of such agricultural activities with a 
reliance on under-priced (meaning subsidised) IBT-
sourced water; such a reliance not being sustainable in 
the long-term. 
As seen in the situation of the Upper Acheloos 
Diversion project in Greece (see case study 4 in 
section 4), the IBT is justiﬁed (in large part) on the 
premise that it will sustain the agricultural industry, 
and in particular the cotton production in the Thessaly 
plains. It is however highly questionable whether 
cotton production here would be economically viable 
without the large subsidies it receives. Within the EU, 
only Spain and Greece have sizeable cotton production 
and in 2001 together they accounted for 2.5% of 
cotton production and 6% of world exports in cotton. 
At the same time they received 16% of world cotton 
subsidies. In 2002/03 it is estimated that under the 
EU’s common agricultural policy (CAP), subsidies 
exceeded US$ 900 million (Gillson et al 2004). 
6.2  IBTs that fail to examine alternatives
Examining the alternatives to IBTs should be 
considered before embarking on engineering-based 
solutions to regional water shortages. Such alternatives 
may reveal that the development of an IBT can be 
delayed, deferred for several years, or perhaps avoided 
altogether. Global experiences show that all too often 
the decision is taken to proceed with an IBT before 
these alternatives are fully considered. While these 
alternatives may take longer to analyse, and even 
implement, if they avoid the environmental, social and 
economic costs of the typical IBT then they are clearly 
worth the investment.
In a major assessment of IBTs, Ghassemi and White 
(2007:24) declare that “policy makers and water 
resources managers of basins with apparent water 
shortages should ﬁrstly exhaust all possibilities for 
better management of their own water by:
1) Eliminating losses in their current water supply 
network;
2) Increase water use efﬁciencies;
3) Conjunctive use of water and ground water 
resources;
4) Increasing water prices to promote water use 
efﬁciency and shift water use from low value to 
higher value production systems;
5) Reclamation of wastewater in municipal 
areas; reviewing policy and regulations; and 
improving monitoring.’
Ghassemi and White (2007:354) go onto describe 
“Water conservation measures that can be used as a 
substitute for interbasin water transfer projects and new 
sources of water supply include the following” and go 
onto detail:
• Increasing water use efﬁciency;
• Water trading;
• Wastewater reclamation;
• Conjunctive use of surface and groundwater;
• Water metering and pricing;
• Cloud seeding;
• Water desalination; and
• Building new dams.
In moving to examine the alternatives to an IBT, WWF 
recommends the following systematic and step-wise 
approach. As considered further in sections 5.3 and 7, 
ideally these options are considered at a whole-of-river-
basin level, through an integrated planning process. 
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The alternatives should be considered in the following 
order: 
A. Demand Management
1. Reducing water demands;
2. Recycling waste water; 
3. Assessing and promoting land use management 
or industrial development alternatives.
B. Supply Management
4. Trading in virtual water, and only then,
5. Supplementing water supplies locally, and only 
then,
6. Desalination in water-scarce coastal areas, and 
only then,
7. Considering an IBT, as a last option.
Below, each of these options are examined more closely 
and in many cases illustrated with real life examples or 
tools that can be used to see them applied.
6.2.1  Reducing water demands
Demand management simply means manipulating or 
adjusting water demands so they don’t exceed supplies. 
Demand management is fundamentally about ﬁnding 
water use efﬁciencies wherever they are available 
across the many ways that society uses water. Demand 
management is, to use ﬁnancial terms, ‘living within 
ones means’, or ‘not overspending the budget’. Such 
water efﬁciencies exist in almost every facet of water 
use and the task is to identify them, raise awareness on 
them of them, and ﬁnd ways, means and incentives to 
see these water savings achieved. 
Here, WWF outlines some of these demand 
management options in more detail:
Domestic and urban water users
Globally, households use only about 10% of water 
diverted (Turton & Henwood 2002), and some of the 
water saving practices available in the home include:
• Reducing water application on the garden (for 
example, through planting species that require 
less water, mulching around plants, using 
‘grey water’, installing more efﬁcient watering 
systems etc);
• Closing taps while brushing teeth;
• Installing low-ﬂush-toilets;
• Repairing leaking taps;
• Washing the car, motorbike or bike with a 
bucket instead of a garden hose;
• Washing dishes in a tub instead of under 
running water; and
• Installing low-ﬂow shower heads.
An example of where these types of measures have 
been promoted successfully is in south-east Queensland 
on the eastern seaboard of Australia (see box below). 
In another example, the Environment Agency of 
England and Wales has recently identiﬁed metering 
water use, from 33% of households today, and charging 
for water use by volume as having the greatest potential 
to reduce emissions associated with water supply 
through improved household water efﬁciency.
Education programs - a key tool in demand 
management
To create a better understanding of water issues and 
help resolve water resource problems, educational 
programs are highly recommended. Community, 
industry and school education programs raise 
awareness about the need to conserve water and to 
bring about long term changes in water consumption 
behaviour. This is only possible if the targeted 
community is able to obtain the necessary knowledge 
and gain understanding of water management that 
can then be adapted to their own needs and local 
circumstances (AWA 2005). 
Most successful are education programs that are 
providing practical solutions. Water education programs 
for primary and secondary schools are encouraged so as 
to promote awareness in the next generation of decision 
makers. 
Important aspects of such programs are that they 
provide the person with some real life examples to 
point him/her in the right direction; that include simple 
water saving ideas which do not change their way of 
living and that are geographically relevant at local, 
regional and national levels.
In general, water costs are not well reﬂected in the price 
of products due to the subsidies in the water sector, 
particularly for agricultural users. The general public 
is, although often aware of energy requirements, much 
less aware of the water requirements in producing their 
goods and services (Chapagain & Hoekstra 2004). This 
presents an opportunity to change water use-related 
purchasing behaviour through education.
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Box: Household water efﬁciency measures promoted in a region of Australia
South East Queensland (Australia):
Water demand management is in part about increasing public awareness of water issues and encouraging 
more efﬁcient use of water, without diminishing quality of life. Society needs to treat water as a valuable 
resource. 
There needs to be a focus on educating the community so that they are able to gain an understanding of the 
economic and ecological beneﬁts of reducing water consumption. 
An example of such management is in south-east Queensland where there has been a reduction of water 
demand by up to 18% in some local government areas (AWA 2005).
Examples of some of the initiatives used include:
• User-pays pricing and universal water metering;
• Encouragement of the installation of water efﬁcient devices using rebates/discounts, for example, 
dual ﬂush toilets and low ﬂow shower heads;
• Routine restrictions on garden watering;
• Incentives for plumbing efﬁciency ‘check-ups’;
• Educational campaigns; and
• Lowering water pressure in districts where this is feasible.
Agricultural water users
Currently, 16% of global cropland is irrigated, 
producing 40% of all food. This makes irrigated 
agriculture about 3.6 times more productive per unit-
area than non-irrigated agriculture (Chapagain Orr 
2008). 
The Comprehensive Assessment of Water Management 
in Agriculture (CAoWMiA 2007:2-14) recently 
assessed the options for meeting the world’s need for 
agricultural produce with available water supplies. 
They warn that “Without further improvements in water 
productivity or major shifts in production patterns, the 
amount of water consumed by evapotranspiration in 
agriculture will increase by 70%–90% by 2050. The 
total amount of water evaporated in crop production 
would amount to 12 000–13 500 cubic kilometers, 
almost doubling the 7 130 cubic kilometers of today. 
[…] On top of this is the amount of water needed to 
produce ﬁber and biomass for energy”. The assessment 
goes onto highlight that: “75% of the additional 
food we need over the next decades could be met by 
bringing the production levels of the world’s low-yield 
farmers up to 80% of what high-yield farmers get from 
comparable land. […] the greatest potential increases in 
yields are in rainfed areas, where many of the world’s 
poorest rural people live and where managing water is 
the key to such increases. […] while there will probably 
be some need to expand the amount of land we irrigate 
to feed 8–9 billion people […] there is real scope to 
improve production on many existing irrigated lands.” 
They note that: “A 35% increase in water productivity 
could reduce additional crop water consumption 
from 80% to 20%.” The assessment concludes by 
recommending eight policy actions to:
1) Change the way we think about water and 
agriculture. 
2) Fight poverty by improving access to 
agricultural water and its use. 
3) Manage agriculture to enhance ecosystem 
services. 
4) Increase the productivity of water. 
5) Upgrade rainfed systems—a little water can go 
a long way. 
6) Adapt yesterday’s irrigation to tomorrow’s 
needs. 
7) Reform the reform process—targeting state 
institutions. 
8) Deal with tradeoffs and make difﬁcult choices.
Implementing measures for conserving and making 
more efﬁcient use of the water already allocated to 
agriculture is a most appealing ﬁrst option. This is 
especially so given that current overall water-use 
efﬁciency is low: only an estimated 37% per cent of 
diverted waters is effectively consumed by the crops for 
which they are intended (WWAP 2009:115). The many 
opportunities that exist for improving water efﬁciency, 
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in both irrigated and rain-fed agriculture, mean that 
more food could be grown without increasing existing 
levels of water use. There are two basic means by 
which water-use efﬁciency can be improved: 
(a) increasing the share of the water actually taken 
up by plants, and 
(b) producing more crop per unit of water (WWF 
2003a).
Water-saving practices in agriculture include (WWF 
2003a):
• Broad bed cultivation is a useful method, 
particularly in irrigated wheat; 
• Alternate furrow cultivation of beans and maize 
is an alternative to save water (up to 50% in 
Pakistan); 
• Cultivation of aerobic rice varieties;
• Drip and sprinkler irrigation for sugarcane, 
cotton and wheat;
• Use of the no-tillage approach;
• Growing different crops that require less water; 
and
• Change to organically grown crops.
To further improve water use efﬁciency within the 
production of crops the accurate measurement of water 
use on a crop and farm scale is the ﬁrst step. 
6.2.2  Recycling waste waters
To some water management practitioners, recycling 
waste or used water falls within the realm of demand 
management. Here it is considered separately to draw 
attention to the potential that it offers as part of the 
alternatives to the construction of an IBT scheme.
Treatment and then reuse of water from irrigation 
and stormwater drainage, sewage and other efﬂuents, 
industry and utilities can greatly supplement local water 
supplies. The annual reclaimed water volumes total 
about 2.2 billion m3, based on 2000 and 2001 ﬁgures 
from the World Bank (WWAP 2006). On a global scale, 
non-potable water reuse is currently the dominant 
means of supplementing supplies for irrigation, 
industrial cooling, river ﬂows and other applications. 
Due to increases in potable water consumption, the 
total volume of these recycled resources is likely to 
increase by 3-5% per year based on current water use 
patterns (UNDP 2004).
Yet in some cultures, reuse of water has not yet been 
publicly accepted. According to surveys, the best 
water reuse projects in terms of economic viability and 
public acceptance are those that substitute reclaimed 
water in lieu of potable water for use in irrigation, 
environmental restoration, cleaning, toilet ﬂushing and 
industrial uses. 
The volume of water available for reuse is considerable, 
with the advantage being that there is a guaranteed 
supply, which is not dependant on weather patterns. 
Some forms (and mechanisms) of water reuse include 
(AWA 2005; Shelef 2001):
• Indirect reuse via river or water storage;
• Aquifer storage and recovery of reused water or 
stormwater. Recharge of groundwater to create 
a barrier to seawater intrusion;
• Industrial reuse;
• Dual reticulation supply of reused water;
• Grey water reuse (for example, toilet ﬂushing in 
hotels, ofﬁce buildings and high-rise buildings, 
using dual water distribution systems);
• Augmentation of recreational bodies of water;
• Irrigation of public parks, sport ﬁelds, etc.;
• Street washing;
• Car and train washing; and 
• Water for ﬁre hydrants.
6.2.3  Virtual water trade
Another way to consider the merit of IBTs for 
promoting agriculture is through the concept of ‚virtual 
water‘. Term is used to describe the amount of water 
used in the production process of goods (Hoekstra and 
Chapagain 2008). For example, the production of 1 
kg of beef requires 16 000 litres of water, though we 
should be careful when and where this water is being 
used in the process. As goods are traded across the 
globe, or between regions within countries, virtual 
water is transferred. According to Hoekstra and 
Chapagain, this virtual water trade can be an important 
instrument in achieving water security and efﬁcient 
use of water, and they argue that virtual water trade 
between or within nations can be a feasible alternative 
to the actual transport of water through interbasin 
transfer schemes. Global virtual water ﬂows during the 
period 1997-2001 added up to 1 625 km³/yr (compared 
to an estimated 400 km³/yr in interbasin water transfers; 
Shiklomanov 1999), with the major share (61%) of 
the virtual water ﬂows between countries is related to 
international trade in crops and crop products, 17% 
is related to the trade in livestock products and the 
rest is related to the industrial products (Chapagain 
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Box: Examples of where ‘virtual water’ is a factor in IBT-related decision making
Southern Africa:
The trade in virtual water can potentially offer an alternative to expensive water transfer schemes in Southern 
Africa. Earle and Turton (2003) pose that there are a number of states in the Southern Africa Development 
Community, such as Angola, DR of Congo, Zambia and Mozambique, that are well suited for grain production and 
have the potential to become surplus producers. These surpluses could then be exported to the richer, water stressed 
nations within the region, such as South Africa, thus reducing the need for physical transfers of water there. To 
achieve this would require substantial investments in agriculture and grain transfer systems, but this could well be 
both more economically, as well as environmentally sustainable, particularly if productivity of existing crop lands 
can be enhanced.
Morocco and Europe:
WWF undertook an assessment on virtual water transfers from water scarce Morocco in July 2006. 
Morocco’s horticulture sector has established links to European markets because of its favourable location, growing 
climate and francophone history. Tomato farms in Souss Massa boast a modernised industry with a high degree of 
technical expertise and tools. Technology transfer occurs in this sector with workers and business people travelling 
between Spain and Morocco, returning and applying the latest advances in crop production techniques. If EU 
quotas are eventually lifted, then Morocco will take advantage of much lower labour costs to concentrate on more 
high-value products. 
Economic development in Morocco has been stimulated in part by the rise of export intensive irrigated agriculture 
and is seen as a vital employment sector for the country’s future. Currently agriculture represents 80% of rural 
employment and more than 40% of national employment. Intensive export-led agriculture has increased pressures 
on the environment and the natural resource base, but most profoundly on freshwater. If current water use patterns 
were to remain constant, water availability per capita would be halved by 2020. Trade restrictions, tax exemptions, 
price support and water subsidies are designed to protect the cereal-dominated agricultural sector, which uses huge 
amounts of scarce water resources inefﬁciently. 
Virtual water experts point out that this problem could be averted by relying on cereal crops from international 
markets, produced in areas with favourable growing conditions for wheat. However, a national desire for food self 
sufﬁciency often over-rides rational discussion as to the optimal allocation of water. 
Irrigated agriculture currently uses 83% of all diverted water in Morocco, where recent droughts have aggravated 
water shortages. This highlights the need for new approaches in national and local water management. This would 
require a more balanced distribution of water use, including adequate pricing measures, to ensure long term 
sustainability. 
Spain and the UK
A study by Chapagain and Orr on virtual water shows that the EU consumes 957 000 tons of Spanish fresh 
tomatoes annually, which evaporates 71 million m³/yr of water and would require 7 million m³/yr of water to dilute 
leached nitrates in Spain. In Spain, tomato production alone evaporates 297 million m³/yr and pollutes 29 million 
m³/yr of freshwater. Depending upon the local agro-climatic character, status of water resources, total tomato 
production volumes and production system, the impact of EU consumption of fresh tomatoes on Spanish fresh 
water is very location speciﬁc. They further argue that unlike the emission of gases and their global mixing effect, 
polluted water is more localised in its impact, while the consequence of having a larger or smaller water footprint 
created by an individual or a nation can be felt directly at locations from where those imports originate.
Hence, re-locating the water footprints by virtual water transfers also needs to be critically examined as the 
consequences sometimes might be counter productive. Chapagain and Orr (2008) suggest that the technical 
solutions to improve the impacts of a water footprint could involve buying and sourcing products from regions of 
higher water abundance or from areas of higher water efﬁciency. Similarly, sourcing from areas where the virtual 
water content of the products is made-up with a majority of green water (effective use of rain water) use of could 
reduce the need to mobilise water from fresh water bodies. An understanding of water impacts is one criterion 
among many when making decisions, but is a crucial element in determining how we can adapt to the challenges of 
facing growing populations’ demand on limited water resources.
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and Hoekstra (2009). They calculated that 16% of the 
global water use is not meant for domestic consumption 
but for export. A recent study by WWF-UK shows that 
UK relies nearly 62% on external water resources for 
the goods and services consumed internally (Chapagain 
and Orr 2008). A similar study by WWF-Germany 
shows that Germany is 50% dependent on external 
water resources to meet its water demands (Sonnenberg 
et al. 2009). These studies clearly show that how 
pivotal trade can be in mitigating water demands.
Before progressing to commission an IBT, there should 
be a comprehensive assessment of the alternatives 
available for providing the water needed in the 
proposed recipient basin. Can this water be provided 
through demand management, water recycling, water 
harvesting etc, before considering a major (and usually 
high cost) infrastructure investment with its possible 
environmental and social impacts? Or, is there an 
alternative to meet the demands by re-distributing 
the water footprints to regions with water surpluses 
(transferring virtual water rather than real water across 
river basins)?
A review of food ﬂows, and subsequently virtual water 
trade, in China (Ma et al., 2006) found that there is a 
food surplus in north China, and a food deﬁcit in south 
China, which is balanced on a national scale through 
import of agricultural products from the north to the 
south. In 1999, south China imported (amongst other 
commodities) 17 million tons of grain, 23 million tons 
of vegetables and 2.4 million tons of dairy products 
from north China. Together with imports of eggs, meat 
and fruit this represented a virtual water import of 
nearly 52 km3/yr. In comparison, the maximum amount 
of water transferred under the three routes of the South-
North transfer (see case study 7 in section 4) is in the 
order of 38-43 km3/yr. These ﬁgures raise the question 
whether the physical transfer of water from south to 
north over such long distances, and at such expense 
makes economic sense, when even larger amounts of 
virtual water are transported back from north to south. 
Other examples of ‘virtual water’ as a consideration in 
IBT development are given in the box below.
There are no easy answers to these questions, but it 
does indicate the need for more research into whether 
some of the water shortages in north China can be 
addressed otherwise than through IBT.
6.2.4  Supplementing water supplies locally
Rainwater harvesting
Rainwater management, also known as harvesting, is 
receiving renewed attention as an alternative to, or a 
means of, augmenting water supplies. 
Intercepting and collecting rainwater where it falls is a 
practice that extends back to pre-biblical times. It was 
used 4 000 years ago in Palestine and Greece and in 
South Asia over the last 8 000 years. In ancient Rome, 
paved courtyards captured rain that supplemented 
the city’s supply from aqueducts and as early as 3000 
BC, in Baluchistan, farming communities impounded 
rainwater for irrigation. 
Recently in India, harvesting has been used extensively 
to directly recharge groundwater at rates exceeding 
natural recharge conditions. Reports from other 
international organizations focusing on this area 
indicate that eleven recent projects across Delhi 
resulted in groundwater level increases of from 5 to 
10 metres in just two years. In fact, the application of 
rainwater management in India is likely to be one of the 
most modern in the world. 
The site www.rainwaterharvesting.org provides 
links to cases where rainwater management has been 
successfully applied in different nations in both urban 
and rural settings.
An advantage of rainwater harvesting is that its costs 
are relatively modest and that individual or community 
programs can locally develop and manage the required 
infrastructures (collection devices, basins, storage 
tanks, surface or below-ground recharge structures or 
wells). 
Larger scale rainwater harvesting schemes, which 
intercept runoff using low-height berms or spreading 
dikes to increase inﬁltration, have also been introduced 
in upstream catchments where deforestation has 
decreased water availability (WWAP, 2006). A word of 
caution is warranted here however, as in some parts of 
Australia (for example) the large scale interception of 
overland run-off ﬂows to support irrigated ‘thirsty crop’ 
agriculture in arid and semi-arid areas has denied this 
water from other downstream users, notably graziers. 
Large, shallow impoundments are used to store this 
water, from which evaporation rates are very high. 
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Downstream rivers are suffering, including signiﬁcant 
wetlands areas. Rainwater harvesting such as this is 
highly inefﬁcient and not in the best interests of the 
majority of those downstream within the basin. 
Restoring traditional water management structures
The restoration of traditional water harvesting 
technologies is proving to be a beneﬁcial means of 
improving modern water supplies in some countries. 
An example, are the traditional water storage systems, 
known as tanks, found in the mid-Godavari basin 
of India. These tanks have a history of 1 500 years 
with some of the systems built in 1100 AD perfectly 
functioning even today in the Warangal district. 
These systems were designed and built to meet several 
social, economic and ecological functions. Primarily 
they store monsoon rain to meet the agricultural, 
ﬁsheries, religious, grazing, groundwater recharge, 
washing and drinking water needs of the people as 
well for livestock water supplies. Every village in the 
southern parts of India and Sri Lanka has more than 
one traditional tank. 
Using GIS techniques within the Maner sub-basin (an 
area of 13 033 km2) of the Godavari River of India, 
WWF recently identiﬁed 6 234 traditional water 
tanks, covering an area of 58 870 ha or about 5% of 
the region. Of these, 57 tanks are more than 100 ha in 
area. If restored to 3 metres average depth, these 6 234 
tanks could hold about 1.74 billion m3 of water, by just 
capturing 15-20% of the rainfall (Gujja et al. in press). 
The restoration of these tanks has three major beneﬁts:
a) the silt and clay removed from the tanks can 
be spread on ﬁelds to improve the fertility and 
water holding capacity of farm soils, reducing 
the need for artiﬁcial fertilisers, improving crop 
productivity immediately, and recovering the 
costs;
b) most of the restoration work can be done by the 
community, thus generating local employment; 
and
c) restoration will recharge the extensive areas of 
depleted groundwater aquifers, restoring use of 
many existing wells that have dried up.
In this way the water needs of some of the poorest rural 
communities across an extensive region of the Deccan 
Plateau can be met without resorting to expensive water 
infrastructure. Presently the irrigated area in the Maner 
sub-basin is around 400 000 ha. Through renovating the 
traditional tanks this irrigated area can be provided with 
more assured water and also support an increase in area 
for irrigated crops of another 200,000 ha. An estimate 
of the ﬁnances required to renovate all the tanks to 3 m 
depth is in the order of US$ 635 million over ﬁve years. 
This is much cheaper than construction of large dams 
and transfers to serve the same purpose. For example, 
the 2.13 billion m3 dam proposed on the Godavari River 
at Polavaram to divert 8.13 billion m³ of water per year 
to the coastal plains (Gujja et al. 2006) – part of the 
Indian Government’s proposed interlinking of rivers 
scheme - is expected to irrigate only 290 000 ha and 
has a cost of ~US$ 4 billion. The dam will also remove 
more than 250 000 people from their traditional homes 
and submerge more than 60 000 ha of productive land 
and forest. 
6.2.5  Desalination
Use of desalinisation is increasing, especially in water-
scarce coastal areas, including the USA, Mediterranean 
basin and the Middle East, India, China, Australia 
and small island states. There is also a desalinisation 
proposal for London. 
Photo 8: Restored village water tanks near Wrangal, India. There 
are around 209 000 such tanks in India that could be part of an 
alternative to IBTs. © J. Pittock
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Criticised as ‘bottled energy’, desalination could 
provide a reliable source of potable water without 
being reliant on rainfall. However, desalinisation is 
an ‘energy hungry’ process and critics point to this 
as a negative of this option when it relies on energy 
derived from fossil fuels. Environmental problems 
associated with desalinisation include disposal of the 
waste brine solution and biocides used to wash the 
plant membranes. In spite of major advances in energy 
efﬁciency, these major problems remain an obstacle 
to the wider use of desalinisation technologies (AWA 
2005). 
WWF assessed this technology (Dickie 2007) and 
proposed a framework for making economically 
and environmentally sound decisions on large scale 
projects. In WWF’s view supply-side investments in 
desalination plants raise some similar questions as 
for interbasin transfer scheme. WWF recommends 
considering desalination and in particular seawater 
desalination as an option only:
• after integrated water resource management 
plans are in place at the catchment and local 
levels and these demonstrate a need to augment 
water supplies;
• for seawater desalination, after relevant marine 
protection plans are in place;
• where robust land use planning schemes 
that give adequate weight to environmental 
constraints exist and are enforced. These may 
include provisions to manage demand through 
the exclusion of thirsty developments such as 
irrigated agriculture or golf courses from water 
scarce districts;
• after all no regrets conservation and efﬁciency 
measures have already been undertaken or 
allowed for in the assessment of water needs 
in the proposed area of supply. Implementation 
plans backed by adequate resourcing should 
exist for medium and longer term water 
conservation and efﬁciency measures;
• where water, including agricultural water, is 
appropriately priced to reﬂect the full costs of 
supply. Where social reasons exist for reducing 
the real cost of water, the subsidies should be 
directed speciﬁcally to the target group, should 
be transparent and should not be applied to the 
water price;
• where the capital expenditure devoted 
to desalination plants could not be more 
productively or cost-effectively be devoted to:
- demand management as an alternative to 
additional supply
- using related technologies to recycle water;
- using related technologies to treat 
“impaired water” resulting from prior poor 
environmental practice;
- restoring the functioning of damaged 
natural water supply systems.
Like interbasin transfer schemes, desalination plants 
can use a lot of energy, especially in pumping. WWF 
recommends that such plants should be made climate 
neutral. Accordingly plant promoters and approval 
agencies need to ensure that plants are:
• designed to use the most energy efﬁcient 
technologies
• developed in stages to take advantage of 
improving energy efﬁciency.
• sited with due regard to the need to protect 
sensitive areas and minimise the energy 
required to pump water to consumers
• powered through renewable energy, purchase 
green energy or use “Gold Standard” offsets for 
all their emissions.
WWF’s policy on desalination plants further 
emphasizes the need to ensure desalination plants are 
not subsidized, that their deployment is not driven by 
nor supports water-inefﬁcient downstream impacts, 
and that there is further research on the environmental 
impacts.
6.2.6  Consider IBTs as a last option 
Any proposal for an IBT should be placed under the 
decision making microscope before a decision is taken 
to proceed. Too often the very viable alternatives 
to an IBT are not given sufﬁcient attention in such 
decisions. The evidence is clear that these schemes 
can offer solutions to water shortage problems that 
are less costly, less damaging to the environment 
and less disruptive and divisive in society. Frequent 
environmental omissions in the pre-planning and 
execution of IBTs are the provision of adequate 
environmental ﬂows within the donor basin, and the 
management of invasive species transferred with the 
water between basins. Decision makers owe it to their 
constituents to undertake comprehensive cost-beneﬁt 
and risk assessments as part of reaching a decision 
in relation to any proposed IBT, as proposed by the 
WCD (2000) and is addressed in the Section I of the 
Sustainability Assessment Protocol (HSAF 2009).
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6.3  Governance failures in river basin level 
planning
It was noted in the introduction to this section that 
one of the attributes evident in the IBT case studies 
documented in this report (and elsewhere also) is the 
failure of governance arrangements to ensure that 
comprehensive cost-beneﬁt and risk assessments form 
part of IBT-related decision making. Molle (2008) in an 
incisive assessment of the societal determinants of river 
basin closure identiﬁes eight main drivers for over-
committing water resources and ‘over-building’ water 
infrastructure that are equally applicable to interbasin 
transfer schemes:
1) The political economy (beneﬁts) of river basin 
development;
2) Ideology and state building;
3) Fuzziness of water rights and double 
accounting;
4) The malleability of cost-beneﬁt analysis;
5) Regional politics – equity and/or the “grab it 
ﬁrst” strategy;
6) Low risk and high subsidies as a result of public 
funding;
7) The push factor of agrarian pressure and shock 
events; and
8) Lopsided governance and weak public 
participation.
Weak governance is also indicated by the commonly 
witnessed poor to non-existent consultation with 
affected people resulting in insufﬁcient consideration 
or weight being afforded to the environmental, social 
and cultural impacts of the IBT, in both the donor and 
recipient basins. 
Yet another signal of poor governance is the lack of 
consideration at an appropriate management scale, 
meaning failure to look at the impacts of the proposed 
IBT within a river basin management framework. 
Without this, the risks of ‘collateral damage’ from 
the IBT are very much higher. Through employing 
the management model of Integrated River Basin 
Management (IRBM) governments and civil society 
will be much better placed to make well informed 
decisions in relation to IBTs. 
A report prepared in October 2004 for the IRBM 
Task Force of the China Council on International 
Cooperation for Environment and Development, 
proposed a way forward for China to move in 
establishing an IRBM framework for the management 
of its extensive river systems. Some extracts from that 
report (below) help explain the concept of IRBM and 
the rationale behind it (report at www.harbour.sfu.
ca/dlam/04riverbasin%20rpt.htm).
“A key factor that undermines efforts to deliver 
sustainability outcomes is sector-based governance; 
the organization of public administration that 
segregates, rather than integrates, economic, social and 
environmental policy, laws and administration. With 
pressure on water resources intensifying in all parts of 
the world, integrated river basin management (IRBM) 
is rapidly being introduced in many countries as a 
management framework that can help draw together 
economic, social and environmental aspirations.
IRBM is a process of coordinating the management and 
development of the water, land, biological and related 
resources within a river basin, so as to maximize the 
economic and social beneﬁts in an equitable way while 
at the same time conserving freshwater ecosystems and 
species. 
IRBM is also a participatory mechanism for solving 
conﬂicts and allocating water among competing users, 
while recognizing that natural ecosystems are in part 
the suppliers of that resource and the fundamental 
‘natural infrastructure’ that delivers it to human 
users. Natural ecosystems are also key providers of a 
range of ecosystems services (ﬂood mitigation, water 
quality improvement and ﬁsh production for example) 
which previously were overlooked in water resource 
management.” 
“Many of the problems with river and water resource 
management being encountered by China …today are 
also found in other countries. In many of these, IRBM 
is being applied as the administrative framework to 
see enhanced integration of economic development, 
community well-being and environmental sustainability 
into decision-making. Table 1 below summarises both 
the key problems that other countries how encountered 
with managing rivers and water resources and how 
IRBM offers solutions to these problems.” 
Where it is being applied, IRBM differs markedly 
from basin to basin and is strongly dependent on the 
complexity of the basin‘s socio-economic and political 
environment. Most basins face similar hurdles, such as: 
• Gaining political agreement between 
governments (on provincial, national and 
international level);
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Table 1: Summary of international experiences in relation to river basin management and how IRBM offers 
solutions to these problems
The problems The solutions IRBM offers
Institutions and legislation
Sector-based approaches
Historically governments and societies have failed to 
appreciate the intrinsic linkages between economic 
growth, societal wellbeing and environmental 
sustainability, and have established decision-making, 
legal and administrative systems that serve to isolate, 
rather than integrate these pillars of sustainable 
development.
IRBM fosters a change in the way governments do 
business; moving away from sector- based institutions, 
policies and laws, to more integrated approaches.
Institutional weaknesses and lack of integration 
and coordination
Sector-based management and decision-making is 
a product of sector-based institutions, policies and 
laws. Without addressing these fundamentals, the 
implementation of IRBM cannot succeed. Poor 
coordination among Ministries is a strong signal of 
this form of institutional failure. Allied to this are laws 
and policies that promote sector-based management.
IRBM is as much about social and economic 
policy reform as it is about moving to manage the 
environment for long-term sustainability. For this 
reason the implementation of IRBM must be mandated 
by the highest level of Government and be supported 
by appropriate legal and administrative coordination 
tools. 
• Bringing together competing stakeholders 
to share their knowledge, learn, appreciate 
new perspectives and reach agreements on 
sustainable solutions;
• Overcoming the perspective that water and 
aquatic biodiversity are a common resource that 
can be used without limit;
• Gathering high quality, up-to-date data;
• Getting proper assessment of ‚needs and 
options‘ for development proposals;
• Providing incentives for more efﬁcient use of 
diverted waters;
• Planning for the exploitation of a Basin‘s 
resources without undermining their 
sustainability; and
• Ensuring safety for populations from recurring 
ﬂoods and their relationships with land use 
change in the basin (watershed and ﬂoodplain 
especially).
An IRBM plan can focus on various topics, but a basin 
organisation is necessary to coordinate, integrate, 
promote and/or even enforce decisions regarding 
the use and management of natural resources on a 
basin-wide scale. By undertaking options and needs 
assessments, possible alternatives to develop the basin 
in a more sustainable way will be identiﬁed. Tools for 
better water management that may be applied include 
payments for environmental services (see box below) 
and mimicking natural water ﬂows as far as possible 
- environmental ﬂows (Tilders 2002).
To better integrate water use and conservation in 
river basin management, appropriate water laws are 
needed. To maximise conservation and socio-economic 
outcomes, these laws should:
• Deﬁne the water basins or the transboundary 
water basins the law is designed for;
• Ensure water dependent environmental values 
are identiﬁed and adequate water ﬂows are 
allocated for their conservation;
• Deﬁne water rights and apportion the available 
water resource; 
• Deﬁne and install a method to make users pay 
for their water use;
• Treat water rights separately from land titles; 
and
• Enable water rights to be traded, so more 
efﬁcient water users can buy water and produce 
more, and employ more people, by purchasing 
water rights from less efﬁcient users.
To be effective, IRBM also requires strong legal 
mechanisms to provide the management and 
enforcement framework, but also to clarify roles and 
responsibilities. As indicated above, ideally, IRBM 
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The problems The solutions IRBM offers
Inappropriate management scale
River basins provide a convenient and appropriate 
management scale; yet historically management has 
been allowed to operate at small scale without due 
consideration for downstream and broader impacts. 
The paradigm shift to IRBM needs to draw into 
river basin level planning and management ALL 
government Ministries and stakeholders, at all levels; 
national, provincial and local. Decentralisation of 
management responsibility to river basin commissions, 
provincial and local governments is the key to 
successful IRBM. 
Stakeholder and public participation
Unsustainable land and water uses fostered by 
ignorance
Unless the principles of IRBM and sustainability 
are understood by both the government sector and 
civil society, and then applied at the local, provincial 
and river basin levels, the capacity of ecosystems to 
support livelihoods will continue to decline.
Stakeholder and public participation can enhance the 
quality of IRBM decisions and help implementation by 
reducing costs and delays. In order to empower local 
stakeholders it is necessary to invest in education and 
public awareness programs and activities that target all 
sectors of society. 
Lack of transparency and consultation in decision 
making
The failure of governments to inform and consult local 
people about development and river/water resource 
management proposals that may impact on them is 
strongly counter-productive to the ethos of IRBM, 
breeding conﬂict and resentment among stakeholders.
Opportunities to participate in decision-making and 
providing access to management-related data are 
key aspects of gaining the support, involvement and 
commitment of stakeholders for implementing IRBM.
Economic measures and ﬁnancial incentives
Failure to consider all costs (economic, environmental 
and social) of development activities 
Where economic cost and beneﬁts are the primary 
consideration of impact assessment processes, 
then unsustainable land and water use practices are 
promoted when external costs – both environmental 
and social – are excluded from resource allocation 
decisions.
The global trend in impact assessment is to consider 
the full range of environmental, social and economic 
cost and beneﬁts, and this is now supported by 
robust methods for valuing the services provided by 
ecosystems within these assessment processes. 
Failure to provide economic incentives and remove 
disincentives to sustainability 
Not valuing the full range of services provided 
by ecosystems has contributed strongly to their 
widespread degradation. Unsustainable land and 
water management practices have unwittingly been 
encouraged and even subsidized by governments, 
both through their ignorance of the broader social and 
environmental costs , and through the promotion of an 
economic development agenda as a priority.
There is now a vast array of economic measures and 
ﬁnancial incentive options being applied in China 
and internationally that are proving highly successful 
in transforming land and water management into 
sustainable development enterprises. Two of several 
keys to their successful application in a Chinese 
context are to tailor the measures to ﬁt local situations 
and to combine measures together in creative ways.
Applying IRBM-related technologies:
River management problems not being addressed 
through available technologies
Typical river management problems are ﬂooding, 
pollution, water scarcity and loss of biodiversity. 
Associated with these are escalating human 
health costs, damage to urban, rural and industrial 
infrastructure, food and water shortages, and lost 
opportunities for economic development and poverty 
reduction.
An IRBM approach helps to mobilize these 
technologies in a strategic and carefully planned way. 
This leads to a reduction in these impacts, while not 
compromising development and social betterment 
aspirations.
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within each basin is guided by an organisational 
body or commission, which also has its roles and 
responsibilities speciﬁed in law. A key role of such 
commission’s is to plan for sustainability and to do this 
in consultation with stakeholders. In this way, quick ﬁx 
decisions, such as those relating to IBTs can be avoided 
and be replaced with more considered, consultative and 
balanced decision making.
Transboundary watersheds or basins
IRBM, and its associated legal instruments, also 
has a key role with the management, regulation and 
conservation of transboundary watersheds or basins. 
Within countries there are often disputes between sub-
national governments over transfers of water across 
provincial and other boundaries (eg. Joy et al. 2007) 
highlighting the need for better governance. Globally 
there are 263 transnational rivers that drain 45% of 
the Earth’s surface, are home to 40% of the world’s 
Box: Payments for environmental services (PES) – an incentives tool that aligns with IRBM
It is now widely recognised that natural ecosystems produce a wide range of environmental services. These 
include carbon sequestration of forests, regulation of water quality and quantity, scenic beauty, climate 
regulation, ecosystem goods (e.g. ﬁsheries) and biodiversity conservation. Proponents of payments for 
ecosystems services argue that the failure of society to compensate land managers for these services is a key 
contributory factor to the rapid and negative changes in land-use that is being witnessed globally. 
PES mechanisms are market-based instruments that arose as a response to remedy market failures associated 
with environmental services. The basic principle of PES is that those who provide environmental services 
should be rewarded for doing so. This means mechanisms are put in place that transfer rewards from those 
who beneﬁt from the environmental service to those who manage it. For example, land managers have 
the choice to sustainably manage the natural resources on their land that provide environmental services, 
or to allocate their land and natural resources to other alternative uses such as agriculture. In many cases, 
however, the services provided by natural resources are not restricted and the beneﬁts they provide accrue 
beyond the people who manage them. For example, upstream watershed protection services typically 
beneﬁt downstream stakeholders, including drinking water companies, bottling companies and hydroelectric 
companies. In most cases, however, these beneﬁciaries have not compensated upstream land managers for 
the provision of these services, and the result is that beneﬁciaries have been “free-riding” - deriving beneﬁts 
at someone else’s expense.
PES aims to change the incentives for land use in order to maintain or restore the desired environmental 
service. Payment mechanisms assume that decisions on land use and land use change are largely based on 
the net economic beneﬁts that accrue to the land manager. Maintaining land in its natural state that provides 
environmental services is seldom a more attractive option than its conversion. The main reason for this is that 
beneﬁts of environmental services often accrue to stakeholders other than the land manager, ranging from 
downstream stakeholders in the case of the regulation of quality and quantity of water of upstream forests 
and wetlands, to international stakeholders in the case of carbon sequestration of forests. To be effective, the 
payment to the land manager must effectively change the net beneﬁts, making the maintenance of the natural 
resources and the environmental services derived thereof greater than alternative land uses (WWF, CARE 
and IIED, 2005). 
people and contain 60% of global runoff. Unilateral 
action by one country in a basin, such as withdrawing 
too much water through an IBT, can seriously impact 
on other countries and the environment of the basin. 
Multi-national river basin management agreements and 
institutions are needed for sustainable management 
of these rivers. Two treaties provide a framework for 
such agreements and WWF advocates that all relevant 
countries support their implementation. 
a) The 1997 UN Convention on the Law of 
Non-Navigational Uses of International 
Watercourses provides a global framework 
for the sustainable, cooperative and equitable 
management of shared rivers. WWF urges 
governments to ratify this Convention as 17 
more ratiﬁcation are required for the treaty to 
enter into force.
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b) The 1992 Convention of the Protection and 
Use of Transboundary Watercourses and 
International Lakes (Water Convention) within 
the United Nations Economic Commission 
for Europe (UN/ECE) has more effective 
provisions and is intended to strengthen 
national measures for the protection 
and ecologically sound management of 
transboundary surface waters and groundwater. 
The Convention obliges parties to prevent, 
control and reduce water pollution from point 
and non-point sources. The Convention also 
includes provisions for monitoring and research 
and development (UN/ECE, 1992). WWF urges 
UN ECE countries to complete ratiﬁcation of 
the 2003 amendment to the convention that 
would enable non-European countries to join 
this treaty.
In addition, WWF is urging national governments to 
complete negotiations in the United Nations General 
Assembly for adoption of the draft articles on the law 
of transboundary aquifers as a protocol to the 1997 
UN Watercourses Convention in order to promote 
sustainable management of shared groundwater 
systems.
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7  Assessment of interbasin water transfers
It is only comparatively recently as conﬂicts over water 
infrastructure developments have increased that thought 
has gone into assessment criteria for proposed new 
IBTs. Cox summarized and extended a lot of existing 
thought under the auspices of UNESCO in 1999 (Cox 
1999), and his criteria were generally supported at a 
session of the 3rd World Water Forum in 2001 (Bruk 
2001). Cox proposed that a proposed interbasin water 
transfer is justiﬁed, if it satisﬁes the following criteria:
a) Economic productivity impacts
Criterion 1: The area of delivery must face a 
substantial deﬁcit in meeting present or projected 
future water demands after consideration is given to 
alternative water supply sources and all reasonable 
measures for reducing water demand.
Criterion 2: The future development of the area of 
origin must not be substantially constrained by water 
scarcity; however, consideration to transfer that 
constrains future development of an area of origin may 
be appropriate if the area of delivery compensates the 
area of origin for productivity losses.
b) Environmental quality impacts
Criterion 3: A comprehensive environmental 
impact assessment must indicate a reasonable degree 
of certainty that it will not substantially degrade 
environmental quality within the area of origin or 
area of delivery; however, transfer may be justiﬁed 
where compensation to offset environmental injury is 
provided.
c) Socio-cultural impacts
Criterion 4: A comprehensive assessment of socio-
cultural impacts must indicate a reasonable degree 
of certainty that it will not cause substantial socio-
cultural disruption in the area of origin or area of water 
delivery: however, transfer may be justiﬁed where 
compensation to offset potential socio-cultural losses is 
provided.
d) Beneﬁt distribution considerations
Criterion 5: The net beneﬁts from transfer must be 
shared equitably between the area of transfer origin and 
the area of water delivery.
These criteria have much merit but to are also 
circular. Any IBT is likely to substantially degrade 
environmental quality as the river ecosystems have 
evolved to depend on all the natural ﬂows (criterion 3), 
as have the livelihoods of the people who live in these 
basin and depend on freshwater ecosystem services 
(criterion 2). Further, these criteria were developed 
before the full implications of new approaches, such as 
virtual water, and the uncertainty induced by climate 
change brings to freshwater infrastructure projects.
In relation to dams but applicable to IBT’s, the World 
Commission on Dams (WCD 2000) identiﬁed seven 
strategic priorities for improved decision making, 
namely:
1. Gaining public acceptance;
2. Comprehensive options assessment;
3. Addressing existing dams;
4. Sustaining rivers and livelihoods;
5. Recognising entitlements and sharing beneﬁts;
6. Ensuring compliance;
7. Sharing rivers for peace, development and 
security.
These WCD criteria are more comprehensive and 
focussed on institutional processes, and are supported 
by WWF, yet suffer from challenges in interpretation 
at the project scale. WWF is currently participating in 
the “Hydropower Sustainability Assessment Forum” 
with industry, governments and other non-government 
organizations in an attempt to seek agreement on how 
to more practically implement these strategic priorities 
(HSAF 2009). 
The Interbasin Water Transfer Africa Workshop 2006 
in Ghana formulated guidelines to assist African policy 
makers in making informed and comprehensive choices 
from the political, economic, social, environmental 
and technical perspectives of interbasin water transfer 
projects. 
More recently, Gupta and van der Zaag (2008) have 
argued that “grand scale engineering works, such as 
interbasin transfers, are only justiﬁed after all (smaller 
scale) alternatives have been exhausted, and only if 
these works are meant to satisfy, in intention and in 
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implementation, vital human needs. We would further 
argue that […] ﬁve criteria […] needs to be satisﬁed, 
namely:
1. Real surplus and deﬁcit: there is a real surplus 
in the donor basin and a real deﬁcit in the 
recipient basin.
2. Sustainability: the transfer scheme is 
sustainable in terms of economic, social and 
environmental aspects.
3. Good governance: the scheme is developed 
through a process of good governance 
(including participatory decision-making, 
transparency, accountability, the rule of law, 
etc.).
4. Balance existing rights with needs: the scheme 
respects existing rights; if necessary adequate 
compensation measures are agreed. No person 
will be worse off because of the scheme, and 
there are no negative extra-territorial effects.
5. Sound science: the scheme is based on sound 
science, it adequately identiﬁes uncertainty 
and risk and gaps in knowledge. All possible 
alternatives have been considered.
Again, while these criteria have much to commend 
them, they also suffer from similar gaps to Cox in terms 
of meaningless terms like “surplus” and “sustainable” 
in relation to IBTs.
The WWDR assesses water access as concludes 
that: The global distribution of freshwater must be 
considered together with its accessibility. With about 
75% of total annual runoff accessible to humans 
[...] and with slightly more than 80% of the world’s 
population (4.9 billion people) served by renewable and 
accessible water, almost 20% of people are unserved 
by naturally occurring renewable resources and 
must take their supply from ancient aquifers (aquifer 
mining), interbasin transfers and desalinized seawater” 
(WWDR 2009:170). While this narrow assessment 
(excluding such options as great use of virtual water 
trades, for instance) identiﬁes a portion of the world’s 
people that may require IBTs to meet their basic water 
requirements, it also implies that better governance 
is key to meeting the water needs of most people, not 
more interbasin transfers.
In the interim, WWF believes a simple set of measures 
should be used to measure needs and options in relation 
to proposed IBT projects. Having assessed the growing 
impacts of climate change, emerging approaches for 
meeting water needs and alternatives to an IBT, WWF 
recommends the following systematic and step-wise 
approach to identifying how the water needs of people 
may best be met while minimal reliance on IBTs. 
These options are best considered at a whole-of-river-
basin level, through an integrated planning process. 
The alternatives should be considered in the following 
order: 
A. Demand Management
1. Reducing water demands;
2. Recycling waste water; 
3. Assessing and promoting land use management 
or industrial development alternatives.
B. Supply Management
4. Trading in virtual water, and only then,
5. Supplementing water supplies locally, and only 
then,
6. Desalination in water-scarce coastal areas, and 
only then,
7. Considering an IBT, as a last option.
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 8  Conclusions and recommendations
The history of interbasin water transfers (IBTs) to date 
should be sufﬁcient to sound very loud alarm bells for 
any government contemplating such a development. 
However, despite the many lessons we should have 
learnt from past IBT experiences, many decision 
makers today continue to see IBTs as a technical 
solution to restore perceived imbalances in water 
distribution. To illustrate this point, an article in the 
Hydrological Sciences Journal of 2005 states that 
“interbasin transfer of water in India is a long-term 
option to correct the spatial and temporal mismatch of 
water availability and demand, largely owing to the 
monsoon climate” (Jain et al, 2005). 
This is a simplistic point of view based on the false 
notion that moving water from places regarded as 
having ‘water surpluses’, to water scarce areas, can be 
undertaken without signiﬁcant social and environmental 
impacts. This is the “pipe dream” that this publication 
seeks to illuminate.
The development of IBTs, rather than restoring a 
perceived water imbalance, usually disturbs the ﬁnely 
tuned water balance in both the donating and the 
receiving river basin. Regularly overlooked in IBT 
development are the short, medium and longer term 
impacts of moving water from one community (the 
donor basin) and providing it to another (the recipient 
basin). 
There is no escaping the fact that for large parts of 
the human population, water scarcity is a serious 
problem and this is increasingly exacerbated by a 
changing climate. Water shortages can be a product of 
a range of factors apart from drought. These include 
overpopulation of naturally water-poor areas, over-
exploitation of local water resources, inappropriate 
agricultural practices, water wastage etc. Thus, the 
question of how to meet the demand for water in water-
stressed areas remains an urgent one to be answered. 
WWF recognises that while local interbasin transfer 
schemes may, under certain circumstances, fulﬁl an 
important role, for example in supplying drinking 
water to population centres, the beneﬁts of many large 
scale transfer schemes that are still on the drawing 
board are doubtful. In the past many IBTs have caused 
a disproportioned amount of damage to freshwater 
ecosystems in relation to the schemes’ beneﬁts thus 
leading to signiﬁcant losses of ecosystem goods and 
services and unacceptable social and economic impacts 
both in the donor and the recipient basin.
The size of many schemes has meant that a large-scale 
IBT is rarely the most cost effective way of meeting 
water demands. Now, the growing impacts of climate 
change in altering hydrology makes large investments 
in inﬂexible water infrastructure even more risky. 
Concerning too is that in many cases the introduction of 
an IBT does not encourage users to use the water more 
effectively, continuing wasteful practices.
WWF believes that any new interbasin water trans-
fer scheme should be approached in accordance with 
sustainability principles set out by the World Commis-
sion on Dams and addressed by the HSAF revised IHA 
Sustainability Assessment Protocol (HSAF 2009). First 
and foremost this means that any scheme under consi-
deration should be subject to a comprehensive needs 
and options assessment; detailed cost-beneﬁt and risk 
analyses that consider the full suite of potential envi-
ronmental, social and economic impacts.
For those IBT where agriculture is the major driver for 
its construction, land use managegement alternatives 
need to be carefully assessed, including considering 
producing in other regions with higher overall water 
availability and less water stress, or even replacing 
own production by imports of products and stimulating 
less water intensive industry development to generate 
income opportunities for the local population.
As advocated in section 6 of this report, in moving to 
examine the alternatives to an IBT, WWF recommends 
the following step-wise approach, ideally considered 
at a whole-of-river-basin level, through an integrated 
planning process. The alternatives should be considered 
in the following order: 
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A. Demand Management
1. Reducing water demands;
2. Recycling waste water; 
3. Assessing and promoting land use management 
or industrial development alternatives.
B. Supply Management
4. Trading in virtual water, and only then,
5. Supplementing water supplies locally, and only 
then,
6. Desalination in water-scarce coastal areas, and 
only then,
7. Considering an IBT, as a last option.
WWF believes that in many cases the above steps will 
be sufﬁcient to ensure water security within a river 
basin. 
In conclusion, WWF calls on all decision makers to 
follow the steps outlined above when considering how 
to meet water needs in areas of scarcity. There is a 
need to recognise that interbasin water transfer are in 
most cases a “pipe dream” and that the taking of water 
from one river to another usually reﬂects ignorance 
of the social and environmental costs and failure to 
adequately consider better, local alternatives, such a 
improved management of local demand.
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